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ACADEMIC TREAMENT OF
ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA
IN LEADING BIOETHICS TEXTBOOKS
PROLIFE CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS
In order to "identify, catalog, and respond to current academic
coverage of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in law school teaching
materials,"' the six leading textbooks for Bioethics Law courses were
analyzed. These texts include: Health Law and Bioethics by Sandra H.
Johnson, Joan H. Krause, Richard S. Saver, and Robin Fretwell Wilson;
Bioethics and the Law by Janet L. Dolgin and Lois L. Shepherd; Bioethics:
Health Care, Human Rights, and the Law by Arthur B. LaFrance;
Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics by Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L.
Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy S. Jost, and Robert L. Schwartz;
Bioethics and Public Health Law by David Orentlicher, Mary Anne
Bobinski, and Mark A. Hall; and Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology
by Lars Noah and Barbara A. Noah.2
The bioethics texts differ markedly from the constitutional law and
family law texts analyzed in the large amount of text devoted to the topic of
euthanasia. While the treatment of abortion in the bioethics texts is
relatively similar in length to the discussion of abortion in family law and
constitutional law texts surveyed, the discussion of euthanasia in most
bioethics textbooks is almost disproportionately high, usually including
over one hundred pages of cases and notes. This report will first analyze the
textbooks' treatment of euthanasia, followed by an analysis of the treatment
of abortion. Because the textbooks surveyed do not include a separate
1. Grant Proposal, Prolife Center at University of St. Thomas, Life Issues in the Law School
Curriculum, 2 (2010) (on file with Prof. Teresa Collett).
2. SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS (2009) (hereinafter
JOHNSON); JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2009);
ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW (2d ed.
2006); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS (6th ed. 2008);
DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 2008); LARS NOAH
& BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2002) (hereinafter NOAH).
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discussion of infanticide, this report does not include a specific summary of
the textbooks' approaches to that issue but rather includes the discussion of
any related cases within the broader topic of euthanasia. Furthermore,
because Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology: Cases and Materials
does not contain a separate discussion of abortion, infanticide or euthanasia,
it will not be analyzed in this report.3
EUTHANASIA
HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS BY JOHNSON, KRAUSE, SAVER, WILSON
The coverage of euthanasia in this text is notably distinct from that
included in other texts surveyed. The relevant discussion occurs in Part 1I of
the book, in a chapter entitled "Quinlan and Cruzan: Beyond the Symbols."'
The text attributes the chapter to the work of Sandra H. Johnson' and
provides several endnotes at the end of the chapter for support and more
information.6 The chapter begins by introducing Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy
Beth Cruzan, and Terri Marie Schiavo as three young women with
promising futures but diagnosed with persistent vegetative state, leaving
their families with difficult decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment.
This brief introduction cites the relevant cases, includes a summary of each
woman's outcome, and provides a photograph of each woman.' The next
section offers a short biography of each patient,' followed by a description
of the tragedies each woman faced,"o the relevant medical diagnoses and
prognoses," and the decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment made by
the women's family members.12 The text then shifts its focus to the more
public issues relating to each case, summarizing the road to litigation for
each familyl3 and the media and protests that surrounded the
3. NOAH, supra note 2, at 128, 186, 934-35 (briefly mentioning landmark decisions, such as
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) in relation to privacy
rights, FDA regulations, and technology but does not offer any discussion of the cases, nor the
abortion and euthanasia issues).
4. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 53-75.
5. Id at 53.
6. Id. at 72-75.
7. Id. at 53-55.
8. Id.
9. Id at 55-56.
10. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 56-58.
11. Id. at 58-59.
12. Id. at 56-60.
13. Id. at 61-63.
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circumstances.14 After this background information, the text provides short
summaries of the procedural history and outcome of each opinion. 5
The text also includes a summary of how Catholic Church leaders
influenced the three decisions.16 Another brief note discusses the role that
changing medical standards and practices played in the Quinlan decision;
the strong, united voice of medical organizations in Cruzan; and the
absence of the organizations' unified voice in Schiavo." The text then
discusses the reality of withdrawing treatment from each individual,
portraying the "resistance and conflict" amongst family members, despite
the courts' clear orders" as well as the difficulty that each family faced in
life after the tragic events.' 9 The text then concludes the discussion stating
that the decisions "established a highly individualized inquiry for end-of-
life decision making"20 and that the Cruzan and Quinlan cases "reaffirm the
intuition that families should decide such matters, just as much as Terri
Schiavo's story reminds us that this will not always be possible."2'
The text also provides a related chapter entitled In re T.A.C.P. and
In re Baby K: Anencephaly and Slippery Slopes.2 2 This chapter is attributed
to Mary Crossley23 and also includes a list of endnotes providing support
and further information after the substantive material.24 The introduction to
this chapter discusses the medical condition of anencephaly, provides
background facts for the two relevant cases, and offers a summary history
of the issue, including the progression of the controversy and the emergence
of futility. 25 The text then summarizes the story of Stephanie Keene's life,26
followed by a discussion of the effect that the cases discussed in this section
may have on parents.2 7 The next note discusses a few resulting issues from
cases involving anencephaly: organs from anencephalic infants, the
provision of futile care, and the notion of a "disability-blind" medical
treatment.28 The discussion concludes with a paragraph describing the
uncertain nature of the ongoing controversy.2 9
14. Id. at 63-64.
15. Id at 64-66.
16. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 66-68.
17. Id. at 68.
18. Id at 69-70.
19. Id. at 70-71.
20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 72.
22. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 123-41.
23. Id at 123.
24. Id. at 140-41.
25. Id. at 123-30.
26. Id. at 130-35.
27. Id at 135-36.
28. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 136-39.
29. Id. at 139.
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BIOETHICS AND THE LAW BY DOLGIN AND SHEPHERD
The euthanasia issue is discussed in a chapter entitled "Dying."3o
The introduction contains a brief discussion of society's differing views of
death." The text then provides an excerpt from The Role of the Physician in
End-of-Life Care: What More Can We Do? by Dr. DeWitt Baldwin.32 The
first large substantive topic covered in this section is the withholding or
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. The text first focuses on this
issue as it relates to patients without competency and provides excerpts of
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health to illustrate the
"Constitutional and Common Law Right to Refuse Treatment."34 The edited
version contains approximately four pages of the majority opinion, one-half
page of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, one-half page of Justice Scalia's
concurrence, and one page of Justice Brennan's dissent." The first note
following the case questions the "precedential value" of Cruzan by
inquiring whether it established a "right to die" or a "right to refuse
treatment" and suggesting that the answer be found in Washington v.
Glucksberg.36 The next note discusses the standards of decision making,
using excerpts and summaries from Alan Miesel to describe the substituted
judgment standard, the subjective standard, and the best interests standard.37
The following note provides more detail on one of the standards by
summarizing the distinction between best interests and dignitary interests,
including arguments by Norman Cantor." Another note examines the clear
and convincing evidence standard and gives a brief introduction to the Terri
Schiavo case. 39
The next case provided with relative length is Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo.40 The first two notes following the opinion provide
subsequent history to Schiavo4 1 as well as a brief analysis of claims made
30. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 735-836.
31. Id at 735-36.
32. Id at 737 (citing DeWitt C. Baldwin, Jr., The Role of the Physician in End-of-Life Care:
What More Can We Do?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 258 (1999)).
33. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 738.
34. Id at 738-45.
35. Id at 739-45.
36. Id. at 745.
37. Id at 745-46 (citing Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61
U. MIAMI L. REv. 733, 744-45 (2007)).
38. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 746-47 (citing Norman Cantor, The Permanently
Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. MED. 381 (1989)).
39. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 747-48.
40. Id. at 748-53.
41. Id. at 753.
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by Schindler but not included in the edited opinion.42 The next note gives a
more detailed discussion of the permanent or persistent vegetative state,
providing definitions of the condition and describing normal behavior for
patients in such a state.43 Another note describes "the minimally conscious
state," offering examples of the cognitive function of these patients,
arguments from Joseph T. Giacino regarding the need for a continuum in
analyzing brain function,44 a summary of Jerome Groopman's Silent
Minds,45 an explanation of brain recovery from Joseph Fins, 46 and ethical
questions arising from potential misdiagnoses, with support from an article
by Dan Larriviere and Richard Bonnie.47
The next issue the text focuses on is withdrawing or withholding
life-sustaining treatment from patients who are never competent.48 The first
case included in this discussion is Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz.49 The notes following the case inquire as to the
standard of decision making applied by the court"o and provide a summary
of a contrasting New York case, Blouin v. Spitzer."
The text also includes a summary and analysis of advance
directives, introducing the topic with brief definitions of health care
surrogates and a living will, as well as statistics from the New England
Journal of Medicine.52 The discussion continues with excerpts that offer two
different critiques of advance directives: Why I Don't Have a Living Will by
Joanne Lynn53 and Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing
Death with Dignity by Rebecca Dresser.5 4 The series of notes following
these two excerpts explores the topic more by including a discussion of
42. Id at 753-54.
43. Id. at 754-55.
44. Id. at 755 (citing Joseph T. Giacino, The Minimally Conscious State: Defining the
Borders of Consciousness, 150 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RES. 381 (2005)).
45. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 755 (citing Jerome Groopman, Silent Minds, THE
NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 2007, at 38).
46. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 755-56 (citing Joseph J. Fins, The Minimally
Conscious State: Ethics and Diagnostic Nosology, LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS, Fall 2007, at 1,
1).
47. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 756 (citing Dan Larriviere & Richard Bonnie,
Terminating Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Persistent Vegetative State Patients, 66
NEUROLOGY 1624 (2006)).
48. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 760.
49. Id at 760-63.
50. Id. at 763.
51. Id. at 764-65.
52. Id. at 765 (citing Muriel R. Gillick, Advance Care Planning, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 7-
8 (2004)).
53. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 766-67 (citing Joanne Lynn, Why I Don't Have a
Living Will, 19 MED. & HEALTH CARE 101, 101--04 (1991)).
54. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 768-70 (citing Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment:
A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823 (2003)).
[Vol. 6:1
BIOETHICS TEXTBOOKS
family members' knowledge of patient preferences" and physician
preferences,56 with both notes providing arguments from David
Orentlicher," and a further argument from Rebecca Dresser based on a
review of empirical research regarding why few people execute living
wills."
To analyze the legal issues surrounding the use of advance
directives, the casebook includes excerpts from Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse
Geriatric Center, Inc." The first note after this case discusses the "gap
between living wills and doctors' orders," highlighting the difficulty that
can arise in attempting to understand and follow a patient's advance
directives in an emergency situation.60 The next pair of notes briefly
summarizes the potential tort claim of "wrongful living," providing a
number of citations to articles discussing the issue and stating that courts
are reluctant to impose liability on doctors that ignore patient choices
regarding treatment refusal,' and also indicates that "even if a common law
cause of action for wrongful living were recognized, states' advance
directive statutes generally contain a provision for immunity of health care
providers acting in good faith." Another note mentions the topic of living
wills as it relates specifically to pregnant women and cites an article by
Radhika Roa that criticizes these laws." The last note briefly summarizes
the Patient Self-Determination Act.'
The text next examines the issue of competent patients refusing
life-sustaining treatment.65 After a brief introduction to the topic, the text
includes an excerpt from Paul K. Longmore's article, Elizabeth Bouvia,
Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice,66 followed by the edited opinion of
Bouvia v. Superior Court." The notes after the opinion mention the issue of
distinguishing between withdrawing treatment and assisting in suicide; 68
55. DOLGIN &SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 770-71.
56. Id. at 771.
57. Id. at 770-71 (citing David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV.
1255, 1278 (1994)).
58. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 771-72 (citing Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment:
A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1830 (2003)).
59. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 772-73; 988 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
60. Id. at 774 (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 774-75.
62. Id. at 775.
63. Id (citing Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359,
409-14 (2000)).
64. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 775.
65. Id. at 776.
66. Id at 777-81 (citing Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social
Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141 (1987)).
67. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 781-85; 225 Cal. Rptr. 1127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
68. Id at 785.
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inquire as to whether the terminally ill and the permanently disabled should
be viewed differently when the question of withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment arises; 69 mention Ms. Bouvia's changed mind after the decision;"o
and provide a list of cases, along with parentheticals, of other well-known
"cases of a competent individual's successful claim for refusing
treatment." '
The next case included in the text is the British opinion of Ms. B v.
An NHS Hospital Trust, illustrating a different approach to the same result,
as the court "positively affirm[s] the value of Ms. B's life." 72 The text then
includes a number of notes that relate specifically to the facts in Ms. B's
case, including mentioning the emphasis on mental capacity in the
decision;" the proposed one-day weaning program; 74 the apparent sympathy
the court offers for Ms. B's caregivers;7 s and the role of Ms. B's religious
views in the court's opinion. 6
Next, the opinion of Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center is
provided. Directly after the edited version of Causey, the text then
includes excerpts from an article by Thaddeus Mason Pope." The relatively
brief notes that follow explore a broad range of topics. One note
summarizes the differing views of ethics boards and committees 9 while
another suggests that the Texas statute's focus on process makes it a
"superior" statute when compared to those that use a standard of "medically
inappropriate" treatment." Yet another note points the reader back to
Pope's article for questions regarding the "preemption and constitutionality
of futility statutes."8'
The next major issue the text addresses in the euthanasia topic is
"Physician Aid in Hastening Death."82 The text first summarizes arguments
from those who advocate physician-assisted suicide8 ' and then includes
excerpts from Timothy Quill's article, Death and Dignity-A Case of
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id at 786-93.
73. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 793.
74. Id
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id at 793-96; 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
78. Id at 796 99 (citing Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to
Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REv. 1 (2007)).
79. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 799.
80. Id
81. Id at 799-800.
82. Id at 800.
83. Id
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Individualized Decision Making,84 and from Patricia Wesely's Dying
Safely.! Two notes following these excerpts ask questions about critiquing
the respective articles.16 Another note provides more information about Dr.
Quill, including a short summary of Vacco v. Quill, in which the textbook
states, "the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state
bans against physician-assisted suicide."" A final note, introducing the rest
of the chapter, discusses the emphasis on dignity for those who advocate the
right to physician-assisted suicide."
The text then includes an excerpt from Lois Shepherd's article,
Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg." An analysis of the
"Legal Approaches" to physician-assisted death follows, beginning with a
brief summary of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.90 After the
introduction, the text includes edited versions of Compassion in Dying v.
Washington9 1 and Washington v. Glucksberg92 because the two cases
"represent such different viewpoints in the highly volatile debate over
physician-assisted suicide in the United States."93 Directly after these
opinions, the text provides excerpts from the majority in Vacco v. Quill.94
Some notes after this series of cases ask the reader to compare the two
Washington opinions;9 5 to consider whether the Supreme Court's reasoning
that legalized physician-assisted suicide could make it more difficult to
protect against suicidal impulses within those who are depressed or
mentally ill;96 to inquire as to the reason why advocate groups for those
with disabilites oppose physician-assisted suicide;97 to contemplate which
groups of patients the opinion could apply to;98 to compare the differences
and similarities between physician-assisted suicide and abortion;99 to think
about how the court distinguishes between assisted suicide and withdrawal
84. Id. at 800-05 (citing Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized
Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991)).
85. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 805-08 (citing Patricia Wesley, Dying Safely, 8
ISSUES L. & MED. 467 (1993)).
86. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 808.
87. Id
88. Id. at 808-09.
89. Id. at 809-12 (citing Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy After Washington v.
Glucksberg, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431 (1998)).
90. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 812-13.
91. Id. at 813-20.
92. Id. at 820-25 (including only excerpts from the majority opinion).
93. Id. at 813.
94. Id. at 825-27.
95. Id. at 827.
96. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 827.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 827-28.
99. Id. at 828.
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of life support;oo and to draw a relationship between the discussed
jurisprudence and ethics of care.' Another note discusses whether
Washington reaffirmed the distinction between physician-assisted suicide
and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by including excerpts from
David Orentlicher's article, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation:
Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasial02 and from George P.
Smith, III's, Intractable Pain, Palliative Management and the Principle of
Medical Futility.0 3 Yet another note briefly summarizes Justice O'Connor's
concurrence and Justice Breyer's concurrence regarding the right to
palliative care.' 04
To conclude the discussion of euthanasia, the text includes excerpts
from the Oregon Death with Dignity Acto and statistics from the Summary
of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. o6 One pair of notes that follows these
excerpts summarizes the extent of physician involvement allowed in the
Oregon Act,' 7 along with statistics indicating that in a vast minority of
cases, the prescribing physician was present when the medication was
ingested.' Another note questions whether the acceptance of the Oregon
Act was spurred by a cultural desire to continue being independent until
death.' 9 The last two notes briefly summarize Lee v. Oregon"o and
Gonzales v. Oregon' to illustrate the challenges asserted against the
Oregon Act.
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW BY LAFRANCE
The first prolonged discussion of this issue occurs in a section of
the book entitled "Nonpersons" and classifies the relevant group of persons
as "The Undead."l 2 The text first provides a lengthy analysis into the
history of defining death and the issues behind the topic."' Following this
introduction, the text examines brain death, specifically as it applies to
100. Id. at 829.
101. Id.
102. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 828 (citing David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court
and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 947 (1997)).
103. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 828-29 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 829.
105. Id. at 830-33.
106. Id at 833-34 (citation omitted).
107. 1d at 834.
108. Id
109. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 834.
110. Id. at 834-35.
111. Id at 835.
112. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 275.
113. Id. at 275-92 (including excerpts from Neman v. Sathyavagiswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th
Cir. 2002) and People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984)).
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anencephalic and conjoint babies. 14 Within this section, LaFrance includes
excerpts from In re Baby K,"5 along with additional background facts
surrounding the case;'l 6 In re T.AC. P.;"' articles and short questions related
to In re TA.C.P.;' and Brittell v. United States."i9
The text continues by examining brain death as a persistent
vegetative state and the level of care that is "appropriate" to such patients.'20
The discussion of this topic begins with excerpts from In re Karen
Quinlan.2' The notes following the case provide a series of questions
regarding the parents' interest, potential physician rights, the proper
emphasis on Catholic beliefs in the decision, the patient's interests, and the
weight given to a prognosis.'22 The text next provides excerpts from Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, including approximately three
pages of the majority opinion, one page of Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
two pages from Justice Scalia's concurrence, and over five pages from
Justice Brennan's dissent.'23 The notes following the Cruzan decision give
information of the trial court's decision upon remand;' 24 inquires into why a
patient in a persistent vegetative state would want to continue treatment and
states that "although it may be assumed that most us would not want to be
maintained in a persistent vegetative state, the Missouri approach is likely
to enforce such maintenance on us. A procedure which maximizes the
margin for error ordinarily is thought to violate due process of laws";' 25
mentions the "clear and convincing" evidence standard'26 and the rejected
"substituted judgment" standard;'2 7 and asks if it would make sense to
declare a person who is in a persistent vegetative state to be dead.12
The text then includes a long discussion of the Terri Schiavo case.
After giving the background of the Terri Schiavo,129 the text continues by
providing excerpts from Schindler v. Schiavo ();I30 notes that mention self-
interest of the husband and parents, a "best interest" analysis, and the
114. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 292.
115. Id. at 292-98 (citing In re Baby "K, " 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994)).
116. Id. at 298-99.
117. Id. at 299-303 (citing In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992)).
118. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 303-04.
119. Id. at 304-10 (this case is more relevant to the abortion issue and will be mentioned again
in that analysis).
120. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 312.
121. Id. at 312-19 (citing In re Karen Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)).
122. Id. at 319-20.
123. Id. at 320-31 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
124. Id. at 331.
125. Id. at 332.
126. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 331.
127. Id. at 332.
128. Id
129. Id at 333.
130. Id at 333-36 (citing Schindler v. Schiavo (1), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).
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"extraordinary maneuvering of the parents, challenging past witnesses and
offering new evidence";"' excerpts from Schindler v. Schiavo (III); 32 and
excerpts from Bush v. Schiavo."' The notes following this series from the
Schiavo case discuss the "hasty" amendment to the United States Judicial
Code, as Congress tried to "confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to
interfere."' 34 The final portion of this section includes excerpts from
Wendland v. Wendland 35 and a series of notes discussing the unprecedented
nature of the Wendland case, the issue at hand, the difference between
"attorney" and "conservator," and the proper interests for the conservator to
take account of.'3 6
Euthanasia is also discussed in the text's chapter entitled "Ethics,
Choices, and Bioethical Contexts.""' The topic is introduced with a
discussion of death and a statement that because of "treatment procedures,
machines, and personnel . . . [fjor many, the fear is no longer the fact of
death but the awful process.""' The first issue considered after this
introduction is "do not resuscitate orders and medical futility.""' The text
provides excerpts from In re Interest of Riley, State of Nebraska v. D'Etta
H.,'4 0 followed by notes that discuss the process of ordering or reversing a
DNR order,'4' who the proper representative may be,'42 and the seemingly
converse relationship between this case and the Quinlan and Cruzan
decisions.1" The text then includes excerpts from Estate ofLucille Austwick
v. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian.'44 The notes after this edited
opinion discuss who should assist the patient, along with the interests the
courts should consider; 45 and the paradox that the Public Guardian needs to
argue that a patient is both competent, and thus her decision should stand,
and incompetent, and thus needs the Guardian to act for her.146 The text also
contains excerpts from First Healthcare Corporation v. Rettinger. 47 The
notes after this decision explore the subsequent procedural history,'148 briefly
131. Id. at 336-37, 340.
132. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 337-39.
133. Id at 340-46.
134. Id. at 346.
135. Id. at 348-55.
136. Id. at 355.
137. Id. at Chapter 4.
138. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1203.
139. Id. at 1204.
140. Id at 1205-06.
141. Id at 1206-07.
142. Id. at 1206.
143. Id.
144. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1207-09.
145. Id. at 1209-10.
146. Id. at 1210.
147. Id. at 1210-14 (including Judge Walker's dissent).
148. Id. at 1214.
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mention the options of a living will and durable power of attorney,14 9 and
touch upon the relationship between Do Not Resuscitate orders and the
rights of patients and families to demand that such orders be entered.so
The next topic in this section is the issue of physician-assisted
suicide.'' The text introduces the topic by providing a brief description of
the difference between active and passive euthanasia.'52 The text then
includes excerpts from Bouvia v. Superior Court.'53 The notes after the
edited opinion include a short biographical description of Elizabeth
Bouvia;15 4 state that the Bouvia case is within the uniformity of allowing
people the right to refuse treatment;' mention the issue of ethics and
scruples of healthcare providers emphasized in Bouvia;'s touch upon the
potential right to die, grounded in the reality that everyone dies
eventually;'" further explore the principle of "double effect";'" and
delineate a difference between refusing treatment and seeking assistance in
dying.'59 The text then provides excerpts from In re Christopher I., as a case
that addresses the issue of seeking assistance in dying.'o The notes that
follow the decision pose questions regarding several issues including,
among others, whether there should have been a guardian ad litem
present;' 6' possible factors to consider in discontinuing care; 162 and the
applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act.163
Excerpts from Washington v. Glucksberg are included next in the
text, with portions from: Parts I and II, Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
Justice Stevens' concurrence (with portions from Parts 1-111), Justice
Souter's concurrence (with portions from Parts II-IV), Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence, and Justice Breyer's concurrence.'" Portions of the Vacco v.
Quill decision are also provided, including an excerpt from Justice Souter's
concurrence.165 One set of notes after the opinions explore the differences
and similarities between a due process rationale and an equal protection
149. Id.
150. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1214-15.
151. Id. at 1217.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1217-23.
154. Id. at 1223.
155. Id.
156. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1224.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1224-35.
161. Id. at 1235.
162. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1235.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1236-50.
165. Id. at 1250-53.
652011]
66 ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
analysis.'66 One note mentions that there are "three or four state interests in
preventing assisted death."i6' Another note looks at the decision to
challenge the statutes on their faces, as well as the potential for an "as
applied" challenged.6 s Another pair of notes briefly explores the
differences in style and analyses between Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Souter.'16  Yet another note provides summaries indicating that
"[p]hysicians are rarely prosecuted" even with the "nearly universal
criminal prohibition on assisting suicide."o
The textbook then provides an edited version of Lee v. State of
Oregon."' The first note after the decision states that Lee v. Oregon was
vacated, remanded, and then dismissed, and then provides statistics
regarding the number of people given prescriptions to assist them in dying
under the Oregon statute.'72 The next note provides information on Oregon
voters' rejection of repealing the law in 1997 and on the prohibition of
federal funds for medications assisting death."' Another note mentions that
the plaintiffs in the Lee case advanced multiple theories (including those
based on Due Process, Equal Protection, the First Amendment, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act).174 Yet another note briefly discusses
approaches taken in other countries.' 7 ' The final notes after this case
provide several citations for articles that discuss euthanasia in other
countries, assisted suicide in general, and Oregon assisted suicide.'76
The opinion of Gonzales v. Oregon follows, including portions of:
Parts I-IV of the majority opinion, Parts 1-111 of Justice Scalia's dissent,
and Justice Thomas' dissent.'77 The notes after the opinion provide several
very brief questions relating to powers of the Attorney General and the
legislature in assisted death issues;'7 1 whether insurance should cover the
cost of death; 9 and other related topics.'" The text then concludes its
discussion of the topic with excerpts from the Oregon Death With Dignity
Act.' 8'
166. Id. at 1253.
167. Id.
168. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1253.
169. Id. at 1254.
170. Id
171. Id at 1254-60.
172. Id. at 1260 (citation omitted).
173. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1260.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1260-61.
176. Id. at 1261-62.
177. Id. at 1262 77.
178. Id. at 1278.
179. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 1278.
180. Id.
181. Id at 1278-83.
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BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHiCS BY FURROW, GREANEY,
JOHNSON, JOST, SCHWARTZ
The text's treatment of euthanasia occurs in the "Life and Death
Decisions" chapter. 8 2 The introduction to this topic mentions a broad range
of issues, such as: classifying a terminally ill patient, a list of terms used in
the field, and the increasingly political nature of the topic.'83 The text first
approaches the right to die from a constitutional perspective, and includes
excerpts from Cruzan v. Director, Department of Health, providing
approximately four pages from the majority opinion, one page from Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, one page from Justice Scalia's concurrence, two
pages from Justice Brennan's dissent, and two pages from Justice Stevens'
dissent.184
The notes following the case explore a wide range of topics. One
note discusses the outcome of Nancy Cruzan after remanding the issue to
the trial court.'" Another note cites Principles of Biomedical Ethics and
examines the ethical principles that operate in health care decisions:
"autonomy, beneficence, and social justice."'8 6 Another note examines
whether the Cruzan decision establishes a constitutionally protected right to
die.' One note also examines the issue of surrogate decision making,"
with yet another note examining the classification of this right as a liberty
interest. 89
Two longer notes summarize both Washington v. Glucksberg' and
Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach."' The note following these summaries
discusses the issue of the cost of providing care to patients, mentioning the
abortion case of Harris v. McRae.'92 The next trio of notes discuss the
reality that most law regarding health care decision making is established
on a state-by-state basis and that Cruzan did not provide much
constitutional guidance to limit state laws; the potential result of differing
state laws; and a summary of the related Matter of Busalacchi case; as well
as a brief note that New York, Michigan, Missouri, and arguably California,
182. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 245.
183. Id. at 245-47.
184. Id. at 247-57.
185. Id. at 257.
186. Id. (citing TOM BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (5th ed. 2001)).
187. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 257-58.
188. Id. at 258.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 258-59 (summarizing both the majority and concurring opinions).
191. Id. at 259.
192. Id. at 259-60.
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have adopted a strict standard in relation to these cases.'93 The final note in
this first section briefly mentions the "excellent symposium" from the
September/October 1990 Hastings Center Report.'94
The next section in the text discusses the issue of "patients deciding
for themselves" and begins with excerpts from Bouvia v. Superior Court, as
an illustration of the general rule."' The first two notes following this edited
opinion include summaries of Bartling v. Superior Court,196 Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc.,'" In re Jobes,198 information that many state
statutes include provisions for when physicians object to decisions of
patients, and a string citation that explores the moral and ethical issues
raised in this topic.199 The next note provides an excerpt from Margaret
Battin's The Least Worst Death.200 Another pair of notes discusses more
details surrounding Ms. Bouvia's case, including that after earning the right
to die by court decision, she changed her mind and accepted medical care to
keep her alive,20' and the fact that the court described Ms. Bouvia's
condition in "startling terms."20 2 Yet another note mentions that the
fundamental principle that competent adults can make all of their own
health care decisions has made it into the statutes of few states. 203 The final
note provides an excerpt from Understanding the Treatment Preferences of
Seriously Ill Patients to illustrate the kind of information that is significant
to patients making decisions about removing life-sustaining medical care.20
The text then includes excerpts from Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz and the four state interests it explores, for the proposition that
"the right to choose to forgo life-sustaining treatment is not absolute, even
for competent adults." 205 After this discussion, the text includes a note
entitled "State Law Bases for a 'Right to Die"' which examines how state
courts have been "encouraged" to find other bases for the right to die by
looking in "state common law, state statutes, or state constitutions."206
193. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 260-61.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 261-65
196. Id. at 266.
197. Id. at 266.
198. Id. at 266-67.
199. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 267.
200. Id. at 267-68 (Margaret Battin, The Least Worst Death, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13-16
(April 1983)).
201. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 268.
202. Id. at 268-69.
203. Id. at 269.
204. Id. (citing Terri R. Fried et al., Understanding the Treatment Preferences of Seriously Ill
Patients, 346 N. ENG. J. MED. 1061 (2002)).
205. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 269-72.
206. Id. at 272-73.
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The next topic the text addresses examines refusing medical
treatment for religious reasons.207 In this section, the text provides excerpts
from Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc.,208 followed by notes summarizing the beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses
and Christian Scientists 209 and providing a string citation of other cases
dealing with similar issues.210 The text also includes excerpts from Public
Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons,2" with subsequent notes
summarizing the concurring opinion, 2 12 the dissent, 2 " and examining "the
rule allowing patients to adhere to their religious faiths, even if that means
that the choice to forgo life-sustaining treatment is different for children."21 4
The text then examines decisional capacity and evaluates different
variables in competency.2 15 Within this section, the text includes excerpts
from Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment216 and the President's
Commission on Decisionmaking Capacity.217 The notes following these
excerpts discuss that "Roth, Meisel, and Lidz suggest that each of their tests
is influenced by the evaluator's analysis of whether the treatment would
succeed"; 2 18 that the question of whether a patient is sufficiently "competent
to forgo life-sustaining treatment has arisen on many occasions," including
the illustration of In re Quackenbush;2 19 that stereotypes may enter into
decisions, including Steven Miles and Allison August's argument that
gender may be an important factor;220 the role of depression, including Mark
Sullivan and Stuart Youngner's argument that patients in a medical-
psychiatric unit should not necessarily "lose their right to refuse medical
207. Id at 273-79.
208. id at 274-75.
209. Id at 275-77.
210. Id. at 276-77.
211. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, 277-78.
212. Id. at 278.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 278-79.
215. Id. at 280-87.
216. Id. at 281-83 (citing Loren H. Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 283 (1977)).
217. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 283-84 (citing President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Decisionmaking
Capacity, I MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 57-60 (1980)).
218. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 284-85.
219. Id. at 285-86.
220. Id. at 286 (citing Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to
Die" 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 85-93 (1990)).
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treatment";22 1 and one final note provides a string cite of other relevant
articles.2 22
The next issue discussed is "Determining the Patient's Choice" and
begins with excerpts from the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of
1993.223 The note directly following this excerpt discusses the history of
advance directives by examining: living wills; durable powers of attorney
for health care; the development of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act;
the values history and the "five wishes" form; family consent laws
(including five reasons for deference to family members from the
President's Commission 224 ); physicians' orders regarding end-of-life care;
religious objections to some provisions of advance directives provisions;
and The Patient Self-Determination Act and advance directives.225 The text
then includes excerpts from In re Eichner to show an example of making
descisions for incompetent patients in the absence of a statute. 2 6 After the
edited opinion, the text discusses the principle of substituted judgment,
providing brief summaries of In re Estate of Longeway2 7 and Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp. Inc. ,228 along with citations to a number of other
cases and articles surrounding the issue.229
Following these notes, the text includes a brief excerpt from In re
Conroy.230 The notes following Conroy provide excerpts from In re Martin,
as that case offers "the most substantial criticism" of the 'subjective,'
'limited-objective,' and 'pure objective' classifications." 23 1 The notes also
discuss the reality of a vegetative state, and Conroy's influence on In re
Jobes and In re Peter.232 They go on to analyze the distinction between
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, as described in
Conroy.233 Another note examines the difference between ordinary and
extraordinary treatment, as also discussed in Conroy.234 A final note draws
attention to the "special status of nutrition and hydration," providing
221. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 286-87 (citing Mark D. Sullivan & Stuart J. Youngner,
Depression, Competence, and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 151 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 971, 977 (1994)).
222. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 287.
223. Id. at 287-94.
224. Id at 299 (citing President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Reserch, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 127
(1983)).
225. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 294-301.
226. Id at 301-02.
227. Id. at 302-03.
228. Id at 303.
229. Id. at 303- 04.
230. Id. at 304-05.
231. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, 305-06.
232. Id at 306-07.
233. Id. at 307.
234. Id. at 307-08.
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excerpts from Conroy and Cruzan, and summarizing McConnell v. Beverly
Enterprises-Connecticut.2 35 The text then provides an excerpt from a
Vatican document regarding the moral and religious significance of
providing artificial nutrition and hydration. 2 36
The next related topic discusses the role of courts and the burden of
proof in cases that involve forgoing life-sustaining treatment. 237 Within this
section, the text first provides excerpts from Conservatorship of
Wendland.238 The notes that follow this case explore several aspects of
Wendland's "clear and convincing evidence" standard239 and provide
excerpts from In re Westchester County Medical Ctr.240
The text then discusses issues from disputes arising between family
members who are acting as decision makers, providing excerpts from the
case of Guardianship of Schiavo.241' After the edited opinion, the text
includes a lengthy note on both the legal and political history of the Schiavo
case.24 2 Several shorter notes follow, questioning the appropriateness of the
court's involvement, 243 the procedures the courts should employ if resort to
a court is necessary,24 two possible options of judicial involvement laid out
in In re Guardianship of Hamlin,"' the question of the judicial process as
an adversary process that Justice Stevens discussed in Cruzan,246 and the
applicability of 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 in right to die cases seeking damages.247
The text then includes excerpts from Superintendent ofBelchertown
State School v. SaikewicZ248 and In re Storar24 9 as illustrations of cases
requiring decisions for patients who have never been competent. Following
the two edited opinions, Furrow provides excerpts from Health Care
Decisions for Mentally Retarded Persons.25 0 The notes after this excerpt
summarize and explain: one justice's disagreement with the Saikewicz case,
as articulated in Care and Protection of Beth;251' a description of In re
235. Id. at 308-10.
236. Id. at 310-11 (citing Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Responses to Certain
Questions of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition
and Hydration (2007)).
237. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 311.
238. Id at 312-20.
239. Id. at 320-24.
240. Id at 320-22.
241. Id. at 325-28.
242. Id. at 328-31.
243. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 331.
244. Id. at 331-32.
245. Id. at 331-32.
246. Id. at 332-33.
247. Id. at 333.
248. Id. at 334-36.
249. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 336-38.
250. Id. at 338-40 (citing N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-b (McKinney 2007)).
251. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 340-41.
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Guardianship of Chantel Nicole R. and the case's relationship to the Health
Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation;25 2 other portions
of the Heath Care Decisions Act and the scope of this statute. 253 Finally the
notes provide a list of articles that describe issues arising specifically with
those who are "mentally retarded" and "developmentally disabled."254
The next discussion in the text surrounds the issue of deciding for
children. The text contains excerpts from Newmark v. Williams, which
provides a pattern for most courts' "encounters with parents' rights to
refuse medical treatment for their children," except for those cases where
the "conditions of the state's child protective services statute are met." 25 5
One note following discusses the general "best interests" test and the more
rare "substituted judgment" theory, and provides brief summaries of the
opinions of Matter of AB and In re D.H.256 The next note provides factors
from the American Medical Association and In re Christopher I. to
consider when determining "if the removal of life sustaining medical care is
in the best interest of a child."257 The next pair of notes explores the
exceptions to the general rule: emancipated minors258 and those with the
"capacity sufficient to understand the nature of' their medical decisions.259
Another pair of notes examines potential issues arising from a conflict
between parents' religious beliefs and the medical treatment of their
children. 26 0 Yet another note describes the reverse situation, where a
hospital may refuse to provide treatment against a parent's wishes, as in In
re K.I, BI. and D.M2 1 The final note in this section briefly mentions that
decisions regarding medical treatment for infants generally presents a
different question than similar decisions regarding older children.262
Another topic covered in this chapter is "Futile Treatment."263 The
text begins this discussion by including a futility policy excerpt 2M and a
portion of the Texas futility statute.265 One note following these excerpts
summarizes the "scientific" and "ethical" definitions of futility, and also
252. Id. at 341.
253. Id.
254. Id at 341-42.
255. Id. at 342-48.
256. Id at 349-50.
257. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 350.
258. Id. at 350-51.
259. Id. at 351.
260. Id at 351-53.
261. Id. at 352.
262. Id. at 353.
263. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 353-61.
264. Id at 355 (citing FROEDTERT HosP. MED. COLL. OF Wis., Futility Policy, (2007),
http://www.capc.org/ipal/ipal-icu/improvement-and-clinical-tools).
265. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 355 58 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
166.046, 166.052, 166.053 (2003)).
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includes the AMA's definition of futility to convey the variety of
interpretations.266 Another note tientions that some "statutes modeled on
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act also have statutory provisions that
provide that physicians need not provide futile care"; it also summarizes an
argument from Thaddeus Pope arguing for the benefits of an "authoritative
and conclusive endpoint for disputes."267 The final two notes provide
citations to several articles further discussing the issue of futility. 6 '
The text next examines decision-making for newborns by providing
a lengthy introduction to the topic, including a summary of the Baby Doe
cases.269 After the introduction, the text offers excerpts from Miller v.
HCA. 270 The notes following the edited opinion contain several lists of
questions to provoke further inquiry into the topic, and also include a
portion of a dissent from the court of appeals regarding the lower court's
decision.271 They also include a string citation of articles that further discuss
the topic of decision-making for newborns.272
The final topic the text discusses is Physician-Assisted Death.273 In
order to establish the constitutional framework of the issue, this section
contains an edited version of Washington v. Glucksberg, including portions
from: Parts I and II, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Souter's
concurrence, and Justice Breyer's concurrence.274 Directly following the
Washington opinion, the text includes excerpts from Vacco v. Quill.275 The
notes following these cases briefly mention the highly emotional responses
to these decisions; 276 summarize Judge Calabresi's Second Circuit
concurrence in Quill;2 77 include a statement from Daniel Callanhan
regarding the passion behind physician-assisted death;278 provide a brief
history of Dr. Jack Kevorkian;279 discuss the ambiguity of prohibited
behavior in statutes; 28 0 include an excerpt from Susan Wolf regarding
woman's requests in the health care system; 281' discuss organized medical
266. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 358-59.
267. Id. at 360 (Thaddeus Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally
Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007)).
268. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 360-61.
269. Id at 362-64.
270. Id. at 365-71.
271. Id. at 372.
272. Id. at 373.
273. Id. at 374-404.
274. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 374-85.
275. Id. at 385-88.
276. Id. at 388-89.
277. Id. at 389.
278. Id. at 389-90 (citing Daniel Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, 19 THE
HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 4 (Supp. 1989)).
279. FURROW ETAL., supra note 2, at 390-91.
280. Id. at 391.
281. Id. at 392 (citing Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted
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groups opposing medical participation in euthanasia or assisted death and
offer a criticism of this stance from Christine Cassel and Diane Meier;282
point to the issue of terminal sedation as mentioned in Justice Rehnquist's
footnote;283 and touch upon the reality that "litigation seeking a right to
physician-assisted death under state constitutional law has also failed thus
far," with a summary of Krischer v. McIver as an example.284
Following these notes, the text includes excerpts from The Oregon
Death with Dignity Act285 and the summary of Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act from 2006.286 After these excerpts, the text provides a series of notes
which more succinctly summarize the Oregon Death with Dignity Act;287
compare a portion of Oregon's Second Annual Report from 2000 with the
excerpt previously provided; 288 summarize the arguments surrounding Lee
v. Oregon;28 9 discuss the federal government's response of enacting several
laws, and briefly summarize the resulting opinion of Gonzales v. Oregon;290
touch upon more recent amendments to the Oregon statute; 2 9 1 mention the
trend of other states to follow Oregon's "success" ;2 92 discuss potential
similarities between those who desire to permit physician-assisted death and
those who desire to outlaw physician-assisted death, drawing support from
Oregon's Firth Annual Report in 2003, and mentioning the promulgation of
pain relief acts; 293 and lastly, briefly compare the issue in the United States
to the laws in other countries.294
BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW BY ORENTLICHER, BOBINSKI, HALL
The text's treatment of the euthanasia issue is included in a chapter
entitled "The Right and 'Duty' to Die." 295 The text introduces the topic
explaining that in ordinary circumstances, the "right to refuse treatment is
not controversial" but that when this refusal results in the patient's death
Suicide and Euthanasia, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 282, 308 (1996)).
282. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 392 (citing Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier,
Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 750,751 (1990)).
283. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 392-93.
284. Id. at 393.
285. Id. at 393-98 (citing Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-
127.897 (2007)).
286. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 398-400 (citing OREGON DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, Summary of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act -2006 (2007)).
287. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 400.
288. Id. at 400-01.
289. Id at 401.
290. Id. at 401-02.
291. Id. at 402.
292. Id
293. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 402-03.
294. Id at 404.
295. DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 229.
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there is a necessity to balance the individual's right to refuse treatment
"with the state's or other persons' interest in preserving the patient's life."296
The text then discusses several factors which led to the social recognition of
a "right to die" and provides a string citation of literature regarding the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment.29 7
The first section within this chapter discusses the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment by "The Competent Patient", defining this type of
patient as one who has a decision-making capacity and can make "informed
and voluntary decisions about medical care." 298 Within this section, the text
provides excerpts of In re Karen Quinlan; 299 In re Conroy; 300 and Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.30 ' The first notes following
these cases discuss "The Individual Interest in Refusing Treatment."30 2 The
text provides the rest of Karen Quinlan's story, as told in Gregory E.
Pence's Classic Cases in Medical Ethics, and discusses the reality that
physicians can incorrectly believe that a patient will be permanently
dependent on a medical treatment.303 The text continues by discussing the
difference in brain function, patient responses, and the duration between a
persistent vegetative state, a coma, and brain death, according to
information in Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Second
of Two Parts).204
The next note discusses the sources of the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, mentioning both the "common law right to be free of
nonconsensual bodily invasion" and "the substantive due process right to
make decisions of critical importance to one's destiny" and mentions the
trend for courts and commentators to read the Cruzan case as establishing
the right to die as a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.305
Ultimately, the textbook asserts that the Cruzan decision collapsed the two
original rights into one liberty interest.306 Another note examines state law,
commenting that "state action has not been viewed as an issue in treatment
withdrawal cases both because state common law grounds are available to
296. Id.
297. Id at 230.
298. Id. at 230-57.
299. Id. at 231-34.
300. Id at 234-37.
301. DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 237-41 (including approximately two
pages of Justice Scalia's dissent).
302. Id at 241-46.
303. Id at 241-42 (citing GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 39 (4th
ed. 2004)).
304. DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 242-43 (citing The Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Second of Two Parts), 330
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1572 (1994)).
305. ORENTLICHER ETAL., supra note 2, at 243.
306. Id at 243.
752011]
76 ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
justify withdrawal and because the courts recognize that the state is doing
more than refusing to intervene but is also using the threat of criminal
liability to effectively force the physician or hospital to treat."0 7 Another
note discusses that while the difference between withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment and withholding life-sustaining treatment has been
rejected in ethics and law, some health care providers have very different
feelings about the two acts-it thus includes an excerpt from Miles J.
Edwards and Susan W. Tolle's Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Request of
a Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor's Anguish."' The next
note again discusses that physicians are "slow to withdraw feeding tubes
because of their personal moral concerns" even though the Cruzan decision
provided for the wide acceptance of patients' decisions to refuse any
medical treatment.3 09 The note then mentions that do-not-resuscitate and do-
not-attempt-resuscitation orders are less controversial and only spark
controversy when the question of whether physicians can override a patient
or patient's family's desire to resuscitate.3"o The final note in this section
explores the costs of care and states that the right to refuse treatment
coincides with concerns of the high cost of medical care, providing
statistics about the health care costs "consumed in the last six or twelve
months of people's lives" from Medical Expenditures During the Last Year
of Life: Findings from the 1992-1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Study
by Donald R. Hoover et al.;'" The Economics of Dying: The Illusion of
Cost Savings at the End of Life by Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Linda L.
Emanuel;3 12 Medical Care in the Last Twelve Months of Life: The Relation
between Age, Functional Status, and Medical Care Expenditures by Anne
A. Scitovsky.3 13
The text then goes on to explore the state's interest in preserving
life, providing another series of notes.314 The first of these notes briefly
307. Id at 243-44.
308. Id at 244-45 (citing Miles J. Edwards & Susan W. Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at
the Request of a Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor's Anguish, 117 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 254, 256 (1992)).
309. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 245-46.
310. Id. at 246.
311. Id (citing Donald R. Hoover et al., Medical Expenditures During the Last Year of Life:
Findings from the 1992-1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Study, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1625
(2002)).
312. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 246 (citing Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L.
Emanuel, The Economics of Dying: The Illusion of Cost Savings at the End of Life, 330 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 540 (1994)).
313. ORENTLICHER et al., supra at 2, at 246 (citing Anne A. Scitovsky, Medical Care in the
Last Twelve Months of Life: The Relation between Age, Functional Status, and Medical Care
Expenditures, 66 MILBANK Q. 640 (1988)). The text also includes signals to other articles but does
not offer a detailed discussion of the content.
314. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 247-52.
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summarizes David Blake's argument that viewing the state's interest to
preserve patients' lives as sufficient to justify the imposition of medical
treatment only when patients want their lives preserved, "conflates the
value of life with the ability to exercise individual autonomy" and "there is
an intrinsic value to a person's life above and beyond the value recognized
by that person.""' The note continues by listing a number of other concerns
related to preserving life from David Orentlicher's Physician-Assisted
Dying: The Conflict with Fundamental Principles of American Law."'6 The
next note 17 discusses a variety of issues related to the balancing of
individual and state interests, briefly summarizing Bouvia v. Superior
Court,3 1' McKay v. Bergstedt,319 Fosmire v. Nicoleau,320 Stamford Hospital
v. Vega,32' a string citation of articles relating to issues unique to the
Jehovah Witness religion,322 and a summary of In re Caulk as an illustration
of the courts' tendency to require continuation of treatment in prisoner
cases.3 23 The text then provides a note discussing the difference between
burdensome treatment and burdensome life, stating that courts have not
differentiated between patients who refuse treatment because the treatment
is not desired, and those who refuse treatment because their life is not
desired.324 Another note discusses the reality that while the appellate courts
have laid down a clear law regarding the right of competent patients to
refuse life-sustaining treatments, "actual practices by physicians and lower
court judges retain some of the Quinlan kind of balancing"3 25 and provides
an excerpt from Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions
to Clinical Medicine.326
315. Id. at 247 (citing David Blake, State Interests in Terminating Medical Treatment, 19(3)
HASTING CENTER REP. 5 (1989)).
316. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 247 (citing David Orentlicher, Physician-Assisted
Dying: The Conflict with Fundamental Principles ofAmerican Law, in MEDICINE UNBOUND: THE
HUMAN BODY AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTION 256 (Blank & Bonnicksen eds.
1994).
317. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 247-51.
318. Id. at 248-49.
319. Id. at 249.
320. Id. at 250.
321. Id
322. Id
323. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 250-51. The text also provides a separate string
cite of cases dealing specifically with medical care for prisoners.
324. Id. at 251.
325. Id. at 251.
326. Id. at 251-52 (citing ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER & WILLIAM J. WINSLADE,
CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 15,
47, 62 (3d ed. 1992)).
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The next series of notes examines the state's interest in preventing
suicide.327 Within these notes, the text briefly summarizes the Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz as an example of the courts' tendency to dismiss
the state's interest in preventing suicide as an objection to the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment.328 The following note discusses Justice Scalia's
dissent in Cruzan for the proposition that there is not a distinction between
refusing life-sustaining treatment and suicide.329 This note also mentions
John A. Robertson's article, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns."*
Another series of notes explores the ethical integrity of the medical
profession."' The first note in this series introduces the topic with the
statement: "The state's interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession has rarely been invoked to prevent the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment."332 The note then provides brief summaries from
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital; Gray v. Romeo; In re Jobes; and In
re Requena as examples of how courts respond to doctors who refuse to
withdraw medical treatment.333 This note also discusses advance directive
statutes and the issue of transferring a patient's care if conflicting views of
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment arise, and lastly, provides a string
citation of relevant articles discussing this topic further.33 4 The second note
in this series examines the legal liability that attaches to this issue by
summarizing Barber v. Superior Court and citing Decisions Near the End
of Life: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments by Mildred Z.
Solomon et al., for the reality that "[a]lthough no physician has suffered
civil or criminal liability for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment at the
request of a patient or the patient's family, physicians often express
concerns about the risks of legal liability when faced with a request to
withdraw treatment."335
A further series of notes discusses the protection of innocent third
parties. 3 36 The first note states that "[c]ourts regularly cite the state's interest
in protecting the interests of innocent third parties when a patient wants to
refuse life-sustaining treatment" and provides a summary of Application of
327. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 252-53.
328. Id
329. Id. at 253.
330. Id. (citing John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 213, 214-15 & n.16 (1975)).
331. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 253-55.
332. Id. at 253.
333. Id. at 253-54.
334. Id. at 254.
335. Id at 255 (citing Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional
Views on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993)).
336. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 255-57.
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the President and Directors of Georgetown College as an example."' The
note continues by stating that more recently courts recognize a parent's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, despite the parent having young
children and providing summaries of In re Debreuil; Fosmire v. Nicoleau;
and Stamford Hospital v. Vega as examples. 3 8 The second note of the series
is entitled "Law on the Books vs. Law in Practice" and again mentions the
Debreuil case, as well as providing a short summary of Wons v. Public
Health Trust.339
The next topic in this refusal of life-sustaining treatment section
explores the law surrounding patients "whose competence is uncertain."340
The text introduces the topic by stating that in the "vast majority" of cases,
it is not clear whether the patient is competent and gives a list of four tests
used to determine competence from Tests of Competency to Consent to
Treatment.34 ' The text then continues this discussion by including excerpts
from Lane v. Candura342 and Department ofHuman Services v. Northern.343
Following these cases, Orentlicher offers a series of notes surrounding the
issue of assessing competence.'" The notes discuss applying the tests for
competence as the issue arose in Northern;345 competence as it applies
specifically to adolescents, summarizing Caldwell v. Bechtol, Belcher v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, In re Swan, In re E.G., and giving a string
citation of articles exploring the mature minor doctrine and other related
issues in the competence of minors;346 and the reliability of patient
decisions, citing Advance Directives: Stability of Patients' Treatment
Choices,347 and Relationship of General Advance Directive Instructions to
Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences in Patients with Serious
Illness348 for the proposition that in the course of the year, treatment
preferences are generally stable amongst patients studied whose health
remained the same, and Prospective Study ofHealth Status Preferences and
337. Id. at 255.
338. Id. at 255-56.
339. Id. at 256-57.
340. Id at 257-63.
341. Id. at 257 (citing Loren H. Roth, Alan Meisel, & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of Competency
to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); and offering a string citation of
articles providing more information).
342. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 257-58.
343. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 258-59.
344. Id. at 259-63.
345. Id at 259 (citing Adrienne M. Martin, Tales Publicly Allowed: Competence, Capacity,
and Religious Beliefs, 3 7(1) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33 (2007)).
346. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 259-62.
347. Id. at 262 (citing Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives: Stability of Patients'
Treatment Choices, 154 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 209 (1994)).
348. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 262 (citing Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al.,
Relationship of General Advance Directive Instructions to Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment
Preferences in Patients with Serious Illness, 152 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2114 (1992)).
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Changes in Preferences Over Time in Older Adults for changes in health
care views when adults' health status worsens.349
The text next examines issues related to the incompetent patient and
the refusal of life-sustaining treatment.3 50 The text first summarizes In re
Farrell,"' and then provides excerpts from In re Conroy352 and In re
Jobes."' Following these two opinions, the text includes an edited version
of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, providing
approximately three pages of the majority opinion, a summary of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, and about three pages of Justice Brennan's
dissent.3 54 The text then provides a summary of the real life events
following the decision in Cruzan, as told in Gregory E. Pence's Classic
Cases in Medical Ethics.3 5 5 In a note following the decision, the text further
explores the rights of incompetent patients, by giving three potential
explanations for a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment for incompetent
people."' The text next examines the issue of implementing this right of
incompetent patients by offering brief summaries of Jobes and Conroy, In
re Westchester County (O'Connor), and In re Tavel."' The note then
continues by summarizing the Health Care Surrogate Act of Illinois358 and
providing string cites to a number of other similar statutes and articles
discussing the relevant issue.35 9 In the same note, the text provides a
summary of the best interests standard from Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz.360 Following this topic, the next note discusses
general trends in procedural rules, using Conroy, Conservatorship of
Wendland, and In re Martin as examples of courts adopting stricter
standards for incompetent patients who are "neither terminally ill nor
permanently unconscious.""' The text then includes a note examining the
argument of making decisions reflecting the "best interests of the patients"
by including an excerpt from Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients: a Critique of the Orthodox Approach by Rebecca
349. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 262-63 (citing Terri R. Fried et al., Prospective
Study of Health Status Preferences and Changes in Preferences Over Time in Older Adults, 166
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 890 (2006)).
350. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2,. at 263-308.
351. Id. at 263-64.
352. Id. at 264-69.
353. Id. at 269-74.
354. Id. at 274-79.
355. Id. at 279 (citing GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 43 (4th ed.
2004)).
356. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 279-80.
357. Id. at 280-82.
358. Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40,40/1-65 (2010).
359. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 282-83.
360. Id. at 283-85.
361. Id. at 285-86.
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Dresser and John Robertson,362 as well as summaries of two arguments
provided by David Orentlicher's Destructuring Disability: Rationing of
Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick 6' and by Norman
F. Boyd's Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?" The note also provides
statistics from How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance
Directive Followed, a study of patients undergoing kidney dialysis and the
hypothetical situation presented to them of developing advanced
Alzheimer's disease,3 65 and from Patients Who Want Their Family and
Physician to Make Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations from
SUPPORT and HELP, a study of patients who were seriously ill regarding
their wishes for CPR in the hypothetical event of cardiac arrest.3 66
Another note in this section discusses family decision making and
includes excerpts from Nancy K. Rhoden's Litigating Life and Death;16 1
David Orentlicher's The Limitations ofLegislation ;16' a summary of Dresser
and Robertson's view;369 and a string citation to other articles providing
further discussion.o In a similar vein, the following note discusses when
disagreements arise among family members as to the proper amount of
care."' This note summarizes statutes that establish a hierarchy of surrogate
decision makers, and the reality that courts are "reluctant to permit
withdrawal of treatment in the presence of a disagreement among family
members" as evidenced in In re Martin, Courture v. Courture, and In re
Schiavo.372 The next note provides information on ethics committees and
consultants, citing Committee on Bioethics findings." The final note in this
362. Id at 286-87 (citing Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality ofLife and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 MED. L.
& HEALTH CARE 234 (1989)).
363. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (citing David Orentlicher, Destructuring
Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 29, 69 (1996)).
364. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (citing Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities
for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. DECIS. MAKING 58 (1990)).
365. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (citing Adwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do
Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directive Followed, 267 JAMA 59 (1992)).
366. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287-88 (citing Christina M. Puchalski, Patients
Who Want Their Family and Physician to Make Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations
from SUPPORT and HELP, 48(5) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 84 (2000)).
367. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 288-89 (citing Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life
and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 438-39 (1988)).
368. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289 (citing David Orentlicher, The Limitations of
Legislation, 53 MD. L. REv. 1255, 1278 (1994)).
369. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289 (citing Rebecca S. Dresser & John A.
Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of
the Orthodox Approach, 17 MED. L. & HEALTH CARE 234 (1989)).
370. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289.
371. ORENTLICHER ETAL., supra note 2, at 289-91.
372. Id. (citations omitted).
373. Id at 291-92 (citing Committee on Bioethics, Institutional Ethics Committees, 107
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series evaluates the court's discouragement of judicial intervention in end-
of-life cases.3 7 4
The text then provides a series of notes regarding advance planning
specifically.37 5 Introducing the topic with a statement that "people can avoid
many of the problems with end-of-life decision making by executing a
living will, durable power of attorney for health care, or other advance
directive while competent," derived from The Right to Die.16 The notes
examine living wills, citing David Orentlicher; 7 the execution of a durable
power of attorney; 378 the reality that in a few states, there is a required
statutory form for advance directives;3 79 the limitations of advance planning,
with citations to The Limitations of Legislation,"'o A Prospective Study of
Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care,38' The Illusion of Patient
Choice in End-of-Life Decisions,382 Refusing Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration: Does Statutory Law Send the Wrong Message?,"' and a string
citation to several other articles providing more information on the topic."M
The next note offers information regarding the related topic of the Patient
Self-Determination Act, briefly summarizing findings from Advance
Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis of the Patient
Self-Determination Act of 1990; Sources of Concern About the Patient Self-
Determination Act; Patient Advance Directives: Facility and Patient
Responses; and several other sources.3 85 Yet another note discusses the
PEDIATRICS 205 (2001)).
374. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 292-93.
375. Id at 293-99.
376. Id at 293 (citing ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE, §§7.01,
7.13 (3d ed. Supp. 2007)).
377. ORENTLICHER et al., supra at 293-94 (citing David Orentlicher, Advance Medical
Directives, 263 JAMA 2365 (1990)).
378. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 294.
379. Id at 295.
380. Id (citing David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255,
1280-1288 (1994)).
381. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 295 (citing Marion Danis et al., A Prospective
Study ofAdvance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991)).
382. Id. at 295 (citing David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life
Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2101-2102 (1992)).
383. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 296 (citing Carol E. Sieger et al., Refusing
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: Does Statutory Law Send the Wrong Message?, 50 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 544 (2002)).
384. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 296.
385. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 296-97 (citing John La Puma, David Orentlicher
& Robert J. Moss, Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis of the
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402 (1991); Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of
Concern About the Patient Self-Determination Act, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1991); and Dept.
of Health and Hum. Servs., Office of Inspector General, PATIENT ADVANCE DIRECTIVES:
FACILITY AND PATIENT RESPONSES (OE-06-91-01131) (August 1993)), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-91-01131 .pdf) (last visited October 28, 2012).
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enforcement of the legal standards and the potential for individuals or
families to sue providers for "administering unwanted life-sustaining
treatments" though "courts have generally refused to impose liability."386
The text provides summaries of Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George
Hospital and Wright v. John Hopkins Health Systems Corp., as examples of
cases in which courts rejected claims based on "wrongful administration of
life-sustaining care. "3 The note also provides citations of several cases in
which courts recognize a cause of action, and conversely, cases in which
courts have required families to pay hospital bills that accrued during the
"unwanted treatment" and also offers a string citation at the end of the note
for articles that discuss the topic further."' The final note within this series
merely provides a long list of article citations for "discussions of advance
directives and/or the Patient Self Determination Act." 389
The next series of notes is devoted to issues arising from young
children and adolescents. 390 The series begins by describing the proposition
in The Right to Die, that generally, parents have authority to make medical
decisions for their children, and that typically, there is a best interests
standard for children.39 ' The note continues with an excerpt from Prince v.
Massachusetts that the "courts typically cite" when ordering treatment for a
child.392 The next note further explores the best interests standard in relation
to children by citing decisions in which courts easily order a child to be
treated if the child can "readily be restored to good health or when
treatment poses little risk."" The note also provides summaries of several
cases in which the courts' decisions included treatments with more
substantial risks or a low likelihood of success and thus, created differing
outcomes, such as Newmark v. Williams,394 In re Hamilton,"' In re
Hojbauer,3 96 Custody of a Minor,397 and In re Phillip B.398
The text then includes a series of notes discussing severely disabled
newborns.3 99 The first note in this series discusses the historical background
386. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 297-99.
387. Id. at 297-98.
388. Id. at 298-99.
389. Id. at 299.
390. Id at 301-04.
391. Id at 301 (citing ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE §9.05[A]
(3d ed. 2007 Supp.)).
392. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 302.
393. Id. at 302.
394. Id at 302-03.
395. Id. at 303.
396. Id
397. Id
398. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 303-04.
399. Id at 304-08.
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of the issue, by summarizing Bowen v. American Hospital Association and
the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.400 The note further explores the
issue by offering an interpretation of one key feature from Forgoing
Medically Provided Nutrition and Hydration in Pediatric Patients.4 0 1 The
note then evaluates the reach of regulations in the issue 402 and the reality
that "parental wishes may be frustrated by the unwillingness of physicians
to withdraw or withhold care, either out of personal conviction or because
of a belief that the federal regulations mandate care."403 Another note in this
series provides a brief summary of the applicability of the Rehabilitation
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to children with severe
disabilities, using a summary of United States v. University Hospital as an
illustration.404 The next note discusses the role of physicians and the general
trend for them to aggressively recommend treatment, citing Sarah Glazer,405
and Betty Wolder Levin, John M. Driscoll, Jr. and Alan R. Fleischman.406
The final note in this series offers a string citation of articles "for further
discussion."407
The next section in "The Right and 'Duty' to Die" chapter is
entitled "Physician Aid in Dying" and begins with excerpts from
Washington v. Glucksberg40 8 and Vacco v. Quill, in which the text includes
a portion of Justice O'Connor's concurrence and a portion of Justice
Stevens' concurrence. 409 Following the excerpted opinion the first note
describes the factual background behind the physician aid in dying issue,
describing the stories of Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Dr. Timothy Quill from
several different sources, and explaining that "juries are generally unwilling
400. Id at 304 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(1)).
401. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 305 (citing Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forgoing
Medically Provided Nutrition and Hydration in Pediatric Patients, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 33,
40-41 (1995)).
402. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 305-06 (citing Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses
and Discrimination: Discriminatory Nontreatment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581, 1613-14 n.134 (1993); Carol R. Leicher & Francis J. DiMario, Termination of
Nutrition and Hydration in a Child with Vegetative State, 148 ARCH. PEDIAT. & ADOLESCENT
MED. 87 (1994)).
403. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 306 (citing Stephen Ashwal et al., The Persistent
Vegetative State in Children: Report of the Child Neurology Society Ethics Committee, 32 ANN.
NEUROL. 570, 573 (1992); and Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G. Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman,
Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 677 (1988)).
404. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 306-07.
405. Id. at 307 (citing Sarah Glazer, Born Too Soon, Too Small, Too Sick; Whatever Happened
to Baby Doe, WASH. POST, Apr. 2 1991 at z8)).
406. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 307 (citing Betty Wolder Levin, John M. Driscoll,
Jr., & Alan R. Fleischman, Treatment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at
Riskfor AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976, 2978 Table 3 (1991)).
407. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 307-08.
408. Id. at 308-14.
409. Id. at 314-19.
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to convict physicians who help dying patients self-administer a lethal dose
of drugs."410
The next note discusses the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
providing statistics of voter results, statistics of deaths under the Death with
Dignity Act, 4 1  and possible reasons that patients desire aid in dying, stating
that "[d]epression was not a significant factor."412 The note also includes a
citation to a study that shows that "[d]ata from the Netherlands suggest that
physicians there are more likely to grant a patient's request for physician
aid in dying or euthanasia."4 13 The notes continue in a similar vein, by next
discussing states' rights and the right to die,4 14 giving very brief summaries
of Oregon v. Ashcroft and Gonzales v. Oregon,4 15 and offering a description
of a national survey performed by Diane E. Meier and others.4 16
Another note provides further information about the plaintiffs in
Glucksberg,417 followed by a note examining the right to refuse treatment
under substantive due process. 4 18 This note provides excerpts from several
court decisions and articles including: In re Conroy;419 Superintendant of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz;420 Doctors Must Not Kill by Willard Gaylin and
others;421 Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill by Leon
410. Id at 319 20 (citing Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989); Lisa Belkin, Doctor
Tells ofFirst Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al; Pam Belluck, Dr.
Kevorkian Is a Murderer, The Jury Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at Al; Dirk Johnson,
Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al; Monica
Davey, Kevorkina Freed After Years in Prison for Aiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2007, at
A3; Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991); Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict Doctor Who Said He
Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al).
411. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 321-23 (citing Oregon Department of Human
Services, Summary of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (March 2007)), available at
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignity
Act/Documents/yearlo.pdf (last visited October 26, 2012).
412. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 322 (citing Linda Ganzini et al., Experiences of
Oregon Nurses and Social Workers with Hospice Patients who Requested Assistance with Suicide,
347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 582 (2002); Robert A. Pearlman et al., Motivations for Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 20 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 234 (2005)).
413. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 322 (citing Jansen-can der Weide et al., Granted,
Undecided, Withdrawn, and Refused Requests for Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 165
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1698 (2005)).
414. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 323-34.
415. Id. at 323.
416. Id at 324 (citing Diane E. Meier et al., Characteristics of Patients Requesting and
Receiving Physician-Assisted Death, 163 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1537 (2003)).
417. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 324 25.
418. Id. at 325-28.
419. Id. at 325.
420. Id.
421. Id (citing Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2140, 2141 (1988)).
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Kass;42 2 Perceptions by Family Members of the Dying Experience of Older
and Seriously Ill Patients by Joanne Lynn and others;423 Managed Care and
Managed Death by Daniel P. Sulmasy; 42 4 Some Non-Religious Views
Against Proposed "Mercy-killing" Legislation by Yale Kamisar;425
Rational Suicide and the Right to Die: Reality and Myth by Yeates Conwell
and Eric D. Caine;426 and When Self-Determination Runs Amok by Daniel
Callahan. 427 The next note describes that while "courts permit withdrawal of
treatment regardless of the patient's condition [they] are generally unwilling
to recognize a right to aid in dying (or euthanasia), also regardless of the
patient's condition" and provides an excerpt from David Orentlicher's
argument in The Legalization ofPhysician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest
Revolution.42 8 The text then includes a note that provokes an inquiry into the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 9 and another note discussing
limiting the right to aid in dying, in which an excerpt from Yale Kamisar's
Against Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited Form is provided.430
Another note discusses the issue of palliative sedation, providing
information from the Netherlands from Judith A. C. Rietjens' Terminal
Sedation and Euthanasia, a brief summary of Abigail Alliance v.
Eschenbach, and a string citation of articles that offer more information
about palliative sedation.43 ' Yet another note examines the predictability of
patient outcome, providing information from Evaluation of Prognostic
Criteria for Determining Hospice Eligibility in Patients with Advanced
Lung, Heart, or Liver Disease; Defining the "Terminally Ill": Insights from
SUPPORT; and Survival of Medicare Patients After Enrollment in Hospice
Programs, which indicates that, while certainty varies from patient to
422. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 325-26 (citing Leon Kass, Neither for Love nor
Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 PUB. INT. 25, 35 (Winter 1989)).
423. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 326 (citing Joanne Lynn et al., Perceptions by
Family Members of the Dying Experience of Older and Seriously Ill Patients, 126 ANNALS
INTERN. MED. 97 (1997)).
424. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 326 (citing Daniel P. Sulmasy, Managed Care and
Managed Death, 155 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 133, 133 (1995)).
425. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 326 (citing Yale Karnisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed "Mercy-killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 669, 690 (1958)).
426. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 326-27 (citing Yeates Conwell and Eric D. Caine,
Rational Suicide and the Right to Die: Reality and Myth, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1 100, 1101-02
(1991)).
427. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 327 (citing Daniel Callahan, When Self-
Determination Runs Amok, 22(2) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 52, 52, 55 (1992)).
428. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, 328-29 (citing David Orentlicher, The Legalization
of Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 463 (1997)).
429. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 329.
430. Id at 329-30 (citing Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited
Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 740-41 (1995)).
431. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 330-31 (citing Judith A. C. Rietjens, Terminal
Sedation and Euthanasia, 166 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 749 (2006)).
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patient, 85% of the patients certified as likely to die within six months, died
within six months.432
The text then includes three notes briefly discussing the issue of
refusing food and water and provides citations to several articles further
examining the topic,433 the ability of a doctor to withdraw from a particular
patient's case due to a conscientious objection,4 34 and the reality that some
statutory proposals are seeking a right to euthanasia.' Another lengthy
note follows with a comparative study of the issue in other countries such as
Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, providing
information from Robert L. Schwartz, Reuters, Maurice A. M. Wachter,
Paul J. van der Maas, M. Simons, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Agnes
van der Heide, Mette L. Rurup, Margaret P. Battin, and Samia A. Hurst and
Alex Mauron.4 36 The text then provides a lengthy excerpt from David
Orentlicher's The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide for an
example of another argument regarding the issue.437 The final substantive
note provides statistics on state laws regarding physician aided dying,438
followed by a note which provides a string citation of articles for further
discussion on the issue.439
432. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 331-32 (citing Ellen Fox et al., Evaluation of
Prognostic Criteria for Determining Hospice Eligibility in Patients with Advanced Lung, Heart,
or Liver Disease, 282 JAMA 1638 (1999); Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the "Terminally Ill":
Insights from SUPPORT, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 311 (1996); and Nicholas A Christakis & Jose J.
Escarce, Survival of Medicare Patients After Enrollment in Hospice Programs, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 172, 174 (1996)).
433. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 332.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 332-33.
436. Id. at 333 35 (citing Robert L. Schwartz, Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of the
Australian Northern Territory, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 157 (1996); Reuters,
Euthanasia Law Struck Down in Australia, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1997, at Al5; Maurice A. M.
Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316 (1989); Paul J. van der Maas et
al., Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End of
Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699, 1701 (1996); Paul J. van der
Maas et al., Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET
669, 672 (1991); M. Simons, Dutch Doctors to Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1995, at A3; Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life
Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001, 362 LANCET 395 (2003); Agnes van der
Heide et al., End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act, 356 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1957 (2007); Mette L. Rurup et al., Physicians' Experiences with Demented Patients with
Advance Euthanasia Directives in the Netherlands, 53 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 1138 (2005);
Margaret P. Battin, Assisted Suicide: Can We Learn from Germany?, 22(2) HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 44 (1992); Samia A. Hurst & Alex Mauron, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland:
Allowing a Role for Non-Physicians, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 271 (2003)).
437. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 335 (citing David Orentlicher, The Legalization of
Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REv. 443,452-53 (1997)).
438. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 335-36.
439. Id. at 336.
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The final section in the euthanasia discussion is entitled "Futility",
in which the physician wants to stop providing medical care." 0 In this
section, the text includes excerpts from In re Baby K"' and Causey v. St.
Francis Medical Center."2 The first note following these excerpts provides
more background about the Baby K case,"3 followed by a note providing
several article citations that discuss futility."" The next note discusses the
definition of futility, under both a qualitative and quantitative analysis,
providing arguments from Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical
Implications"' and Use of the Medical Futility Rationale in Do-Not-
Attempt-Resuscitation Orders." The text then provides a short summary of
a number of futility cases including In re Wanglie, "' In re Jane Doe, In re
Ryan N. Nguyen, Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital, In re
Barbara Howe." The text also provides a summary of the Texas statute
addressing futility" 9 and questions regarding putting the law surrounding
futility into practice.450 Another lengthy note in this series provides
additional perspectives on futility by including excerpts from Guidelines on
the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying: A
Report of the Hastings Center45' and Futility and the Ethics of
Resuscitation.42
The last series of notes relating to the euthanasia topic as a whole
surrounds the issue of brain death.453 The text first provides a medical
background to brain death 5 4 with information from Gustavo Saposnik,4 55 D.
Alan Shewmon,456 and the Ad Hoc Committee at Harvard Medical
440. Id. at 337-54.
441. Id. at 338-41.
442. Id at 342-44.
443. Id at 344.
444. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 344-45.
445. Id. at 345 (citing Lawrence K. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker & Albert R. Jonsen,
Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANN. INTERN. MED. 949 (1990)).
446. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 345 (citing J. Randall Curtiss et a]., Use of the
Medical Futility Rationale in Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders, 273 JAMA 124, 126-27
(1995)).
447. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 345.
448. Id. at 346-47.
449. Id. at 347.
450. Id
451. Id. at 346-47 (citing The Hastings Center: Guidelines on the Termination of Life-
Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying (1987)).
452. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 348 (citing Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody,
Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276, 1277-1278 (1990)).
453. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 348-54.
454. Id at 348-50.
455. Id at 349 (citing Gustavo Saposnik et al., Spontaneous and Reflex Movements in Brain
Death, 54 NEUROLOGY 221 (2000)).
456. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 349 (citing D. Alan Shewmon, Chronic "Brain
Death:" Meta-Analysis and Conceptual Consequences, 51 NEUROLOGY 1538 (1998)).
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School.457 The next pair of notes then examine the meaning of using brain
criteria for the standard of death, by citing a report from the President's
Commission on the Determination of Death and information from
Alexander Capron and Leon Kass,45 8 as well as problems with accepting
integrative capacity as the basis for life, citing arguments by Robert D.
Truog459 and Stuart J. Youngner.460 The next notes also relate to this issue
by providing a string citation of articles that discuss choosing a definition of
death,461 stating that "when a person has been declared dead, that person's
legal representative . .. cannot insist that the patient be maintained on a
ventilator." 462 The note continues by discussing the implications of having
single versus multiple definitions of death4 63 and providing a string citation
on discussing criteria for brain death.46
ABORTION
HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS BY JOHNSON, KRAUSE, SAVER, AND WILSON
Although there is a section in the book entitled "Reproductive
Rights",465 there is no separate discussion of abortion in this chapter or
within any other part of the book.
BIOETHICS AND THE LAW BY DOLG[N AND SHEPHERD
The textbook first mentions the abortion issue in a section of the
"Life" chapter4 66 entitled "The Beginning of Life: Fetuses and Embryos. "467
The topic is introduced by excerpts from Marry Ann Warren's On the
457. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 349 (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of
Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85, 85 (1968)).
458. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 350-51 (citing President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death:
A Report on the Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death 32-38 (1981);
and Alexander M. Capron & Leon Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 102 (1972)).
459. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 351 (citing Robert D. Truog, Is it Time to Abandon
Brain Death?, 27(1) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 29-30 (1997)).
460. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 351 (citing Stuart J. Youngner, Defining Death: A
Superficial and Fragile Consensus, 49 ARCH. NEUROL. 570, 571 (1992)).
461. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 352.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 352 53.
464. Id at 353-54.
465. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 79-93 (Chapter 4).
466. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at Ch. 3.
467. Id. at 112.
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Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,468 James J. McCartney's Embryonic
Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life: Philosophical and Legal
Reflections,4 69 and an encyclical letter of John Paul II entitled, Evangelium
Vitae (The Gospel of Life).470 The notes following these excerpts highlight
Mary Ann Warren's technique of considering personality traits in the
beginning of her article,471 highlight the focus on individuality by Pope John
Paul II and Professor James McCartney,472 provide a summary and an
excerpt from Robin West's Jurisprudence and Gender,473 discuss the
concept of abortion as self-defense by including excerpts from Judith Jarvis
Thomson's A Defense ofAbortion.474
The text then includes portions of Part IX of Roe v. Wade to
establish the legal rights of fetuses.475 One note after the opinion discusses
the role of fetal development on the trimester framework of Roe.476 Another
note cites the relevant precedent for the privacy right established in Roe.477
Another note summarizes Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, stating
that the Court "declined to pass on the constitutionality of the preamble to
Missouri's statute regulating abortion. . . [explaining] that it could be read
simply to express a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, which
states are permitted to do." 478 The next note discusses the emergence of
recognized fetal rights in law, summarizing the federal Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, and providing information from American Law Reports and
Kathleen Murphy.479 A similar note explores the more recent research and
resulting legislation surrounding fetal pain, citing one article by Susan J.
Lee and others, and another by Annie Murphy Paul.4 80 Another note
468. Id at 112-14 (citing Mary Ann Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status ofAbortion, 57
THE MONIST 43-61 (1973)).
469. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 114-16 (citing James J. McCartney, Embryonic
Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life: Philosophical and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L.
REV. 597 (2002)).
470. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 117-18 (citing John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae
(The Gospel ofLife), Mar. 25, 1995).
471. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 18.
472. Id.
473. Id at 119 (citing Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1998)).
474. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 119-20 (citing Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense
ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 47 (1971)).
475. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 121-23.
476. Id. at 123.
477. Id
478. Id. at 124.
479. Id at 124-25 (citing Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for
Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978); and KATHLEEN MURPHY, CONN. L. TRIB. (June
2, 2003)).
480. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 125 (citing Annie Murphy Paul, The First Ache,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 20, 2008; Susan J. Lee, Henry K. Peter Palston, Eleanor A. Drey,
John Colin Partridge, & Mark A. Rosen, Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the
Evidence, 294 JAMA 947 (2005)).
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mentions that states have considered legislation requiring doctors to offer
ultrasounds before an abortion, specifically touching on Oklahoma's statute
and citing an article by Ron Jenkins that summarizes the argument of those
challenging the statute.48' The final note summarizes fetal tissue research,
describes the uses that medical researchers see in fetal research, and the
political history surrounding the issue.48 2
After this series of notes, the text provides a short excerpt from the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.8 An edited version of Gonzales v.
Carhart appears next,48 4 followed by notes briefly summarizing the
difference between D&E and intact D&E procedures 485 and provoking an
inquiry into the relevant state interest in banning intact D&E procedures.486
The main discussion of abortion takes place in a section of the
textbook entitled "Consensual Avoidance of Reproduction" and begins with
a short historical introduction to the issue that has become "an ideological
battlefield in the United States."487 The text then includes excerpts from
popular commentaries such as John Hart Ely's The Wages of Crying Wolf
A Comment on Roe v. Wade,488 Reva Siegel's Reasoning From the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection,489 and Teresa Godwin Phelps' The Sound of Silence Breaking:
Catholic Women, Abortion, and the Law.490 One note following these texts
cites Thomas H. Murray's proposition that "participants in the debate are
generally not open to logical persuasion" and questions whether the debate
will ever be mediated.4 9' Another note discusses how the understanding and
beliefs of embryos change over time.4 92 Ye(another note discusses statistics
481. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 125 (citing Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma is Sued Over
Required Ultrasounds for Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008).
482. DOLGiN & SHEPHERD, supra at 125-26.
483. Id. at 126-27 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) & (b)
(2003)).
484. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 127-28.
485. Id at 128.
486. Id
487. Id at 367-68.
488. Id at 368-70 (citing John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923-926 (1973)).
489. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 370-71 (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 379-80 (1992)).
490. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 371-72 (citing Teresa Godwin Phelps, The Sound
of Silence Breaking: Catholic Women, Abortion, and the Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 547, 565, 567-
68, 569 (1992)).
491. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 372-73 (citing the Prepared Testimony of Thomas
H. Murray before the Senate Judiciary Committee ("Promoting Ethical Regenerative Medicine
Research and Prohibiting Immoral Human Reproductive Cloning"), FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,
March 19, 2003).
492. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 373.
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regarding the rate of abortions from a report by Dr. Vinciguerra.493 The final
note discusses the fact that the abortion right cannot be surrendered through
contract.494
The text next includes a relatively short version of Roe v. Wade,
only providing portions of Parts VIII, X, and XI. 495 One note that follows
briefly discusses the right to privacy and its limitations, by mentioning the
precedent drawn on by the Court and inquiring as to the relationship
between Roe and previous cases. 4 96 The next note discusses abortion and the
views of family, noting that the word "family" or "familial" is used seven
times in the Roe decision, and the note includes an excerpt from Kristin
Luker's Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood.497 Another note
highlights Roe's explanation that abortion is influenced by a person's
philosophy, religion, and experiences, among other things, and provides
citations to several articles that explore these topics further.498 Another note
discusses Justice Ginsburg's opinions on Roe, gives an excerpt from her
article Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, and includes a portion of Justice Blackmun's response to Justice
Ginsburg's article.4 99 The final note regarding the Roe decision mentions
that Jane Roe became a prolife advocate, and filed a motion asking for a
relief from judgment, which was ultimately rejected.o
After a brief note introduction,o' the text then includes an edited
version of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
including approximately five and one-half pages of the majority opinion
and one page of Justice Scalia's concurrence in judgment in part and dissent
in part.502 One note following the opinion describes the undue burden test
and provides a summary of Part V of the opinion.o 3 One note also
highlights the difference between the trimester framework that Roe had
established, and the viability timeline that Casey adopts.5 04 Another pair of
493. Id at 373-74 (citing Timothy J. Vinciguerra, Notes of Food-Soldier, 62 Alb. L. Rev.
1167 (1999)).
494. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 374.
495. Id at 374-77.
496. Id at 377.
497. Id at 377-78 (citing KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD,
158 (1984)).
498. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 378.
499. Id at 378-79 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985); The Justice Harry A. Blackmun Oral
History Project, Supreme Court Historical Society and the Federal Judicial Center (interview
conducted by Prof. Harold Hongju Koh) at 202 (1995), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-
public/collection.html.
500. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 379.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 379-86.
503. Id. at 386-87.
504. Id. at 388.
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notes briefly summarizes Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in part and
dissent in part"os and highlights Justice Scalia's belief that abortion "should
not be resolved by the judiciary."s' The subsequent opinion of Stenberg v.
Carhart is summarized in one of the notes, 07 followed by a brief
description of the statute that banned partial birth abortions.08
To conclude its discussion of abortion, the text provides excerpts
from the Gonzales v. Carhart decision, including portions of Parts I-V from
the majority opinion and Parts I-IV of Justice Ginsburg's dissent.5 09 The
first note following the edited version of Gonzales discusses the distinctions
between Carhart I and Carhart 11. 10 The final two notes are significantly
shorter, mentioning that in Carhart I "the Supreme Court provided for a
physician's judgment to be displaced by congressional judgment"' and
that although "abortions have now been legal for over three decades . . . a
majority of women queried by clinics in Washington state did not realize
that abortion had not always been legal."512
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW BY LAFRANCE
The majority of the abortion topic is discussed in a section of the
text entitled "Nonpersons.""' The text introduces abortion with Roe v.
Wade, stating that Roe and Casey "hold only that fetuses are not 'persons'
under the Constitution's political definitions. They do not say a community
may not consider the interests of a fetus for ethical or public health
purposes."514 The text then includes excerpts from Roe, including portions:
of Parts I and V-X, Justice Douglas' concurrence, Justice Stewart's
concurrence, Justice White's dissent, and Justice Rehnquist's dissent."' The
first note following the edited opinion compares Roe to the landmark cases
of Brown v. Board of Education and Miranda v. Arizona, classifying it as
"one of the most controversial opinions by the United States Supreme Court
in the latter half of the 20h century." 516 The next notes more closely
examine two sources of criticism for the Roe opinion: the trimester
505. Id. at 387-88.
506. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 388.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 388-97.
510. Id at 397.
511. Id.
512. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 2, at 398.
513. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 214. The related topic of prenatal screening and wrongful
birth is discussed in Chapter 4 (971-1003) but it is not analyzed in this report because that portion
of the text does not discuss abortion in specific detail.
514. Id. at 215.
515. Id at 215-26.
516. Id. at 226-27.
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framework' and the constitutional grounding."' The next note discusses
Chief Justice Douglas' invocation of ethical principles in his
concurrence.519Another pair of notes draw a relationship between the fetus
involved in Roe v. Wade and those involved in the Baby M and In re A. C.
cases 5 20 and the protection that fetus may deserve.5 2 1
The text then includes excerpts from Casey, including portions
from: Parts I, II, IV, V (C and D), Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part, and Justice Scalia's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part.5 22 The first note following the opinion
discusses the political history behind Casey and the decision's "proof' that
Roe would not be overturned, even if it could be seen "as a very lukewarm
affirmation of Roe."5 23 The next series of notes analyzes the provision of the
Pennsylvania statute that was invalidated, and then contrasts this spousal
notification provision with other provisions in the statute.5 24 Another note
inquires as to the correct status of the fetus after Casey.5 25 Yet another note
mentions the other issues Casey has an effect on, such as procreative rights,
physician-assisted death, and others.5 26 The final notes provide several
citations to articles that discuss the topic in more depth,5 27 and introduce the
topic of late-term abortion.5 28
Following these notes, the text provides an edited version of
Stenberg v. Carhart, including excerpts from Parts I and II, Justice Stevens'
concurrence, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, Justice Scalia's dissent,
Justice Kennedy's dissent, and Justice Thomas' dissent.5 2 9 After this
opinion, the text first questions the motives behind the "shocking, graphic
descriptions" of D & E and D & X."'o The next pair of notes points out two
novel issues in the Stenberg decision: the Supreme Court addressing the
method of abortion,5 3' and the fact that Nebraska's statute had no health
exception for the health of the mother.532 In the next series of notes the text
517. Id at 227.
518. Id
519. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 227.
520. Id
521. Id at 227-28.
522. Id. at 228-39.
523. Id at 239.
524. Id. at 239-40.
525. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 240.
526. Id
527. Id.
528. Id
529. Id at 241-57.
530. Id at 257-58.
531. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 258.
532. Id
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inquires into several of the Justices' statements or the majority's analysis,
including whether Justice O'Connor would prefer a more narrow statute,5 33
what the proper state interests are at play,534 questioning if and when the
fetus dies,"' along with others.536 Another note briefly mentions the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 2003 and the resulting Carhart v. Gonzales.3' The
final note discusses the importance of a health exception for the life of the
mother, the issue of medications such as RU-486, and the scarcity of those
seeking abortions in rural areas, as reported in Roe versus Reality.538
The text also includes a very brief discussion of abortion within the
section focused on brain death. This discussion includes excerpts from
Brittell v. United States5 39 and a series of notes and questions following the
edited opinion.540 The first note discusses the condition of anencephaly,
explaining that the infants "cannot develop into 'persons' or have a future
or life we would recognize as worth living."54 ' A series of notes mentions
the issue of abortion funding and cites to Harris v. McRae.542 Another note
inquires as to the correct classification of an anencephalic fetus.5 43
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS BY FURROW, GREANEY,
JOHNSON, JOST, SCHWARTZ
The topic of abortion is introduced at the end of the text's
discussion of contraception in a note entitled "The Blurry Distinction
Between Contraception and Abortion-Plan B (The 'Morning After' Pill)
and Mifepristone (RU-86)" which briefly summarizes the difficulty in
determining when a pregnancy begins and analyzes the implications of that
difficulty.544 The majority of the text's treatment of abortion then begins
with excerpts from Roe v. Wade, including portions of Parts I, VI-VIII, X,
and XI.545 The first note following the edited opinion explores Justice
Douglas' concurrence, which relied on the Ninth Amendment as a
foundation for abortion, as another way that the Court could have reached
the same result.5 46 The next note states that Roe was "vigorously criticized,"
533. Id.
534. Id
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, at 258 59.
538. Id. at 259 (citing Roe verses Reality, New Eng. J. Med., 1 (2006)).
539. LAFRANCE, supra note 2, 304-10.
540. Id. at 310-11.
541. Id. at 310.
542. Id. at 310-l1.
543. Id. at 311.
544. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 42-43.
545. Id. at 47-50. Chapter 2 of the text discusses the related topic of issues surrounding when
life begins it will not be analyzed here because the abortion issue is not discussed in great detail.
546. Id.at5l.
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"stirred into action political forces opposed to abortion," and further
explains that Roe was "reaffirmed more than a dozen times in its first
decade, by 1986 the 7-2 majority was down to 5-4."1547 A later note explores
these criticisms more by summarizing two lines of attack against the
decision: the notion that the Court was using substantive due process to
make social policy without regard to legal or constitutional restrictions and
an unclear scientific foundation.548Another note discusses government
funding for abortions, summarizing that the funding has been limited and
that generally, restrictions on the use of government funds for abortions
have been upheld.549
Following these notes, the text provides an edited version of Casey,
including portions from Parts I-VI and from Chief Justice Renquist's
concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part.so Directly following
the Casey opinion, the text offers excerpts from Gonzales v. Carhart,
including sections from Parts I-V,"' Justice Thomas' concurrence,552 and
Justice Ginsburg's dissent.553 The first two notes after the opinion inquire
into the extent that Casey reaffirmed Roe, as well as the proper application
for the undue burden test.554 The next note discusses the increase in abortion
restrictions between 1973 and 1992."' A pair of notes focus more on the
Gonzales opinion, asking what the difference was between the Gonzales
and Stenberg decisions, as well as mentioning that there is not a holding as
to whether "Congress had authority to promulgate the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban of 2003 because that issue was neither raised nor argued.""55
Another note discusses the open possibility of an "as applied" attack on the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act.'
The text also includes a series of notes focused specifically on
regulation of abortions.5 One note examines consent and notification
requirements, providing information pertaining to parental consent, bypass
provisions, debates about familial makeup in contemporary life, and
citations to several cases that inform these issues.559 Other notes discuss the
547. Id (providing a string citation of subsequent abortion jurisprudence).
548. Id. at 52-53 (also providing citations to precedent and subsequent abortion cases).
549. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 51-52 (providing a string citation of abortion cases
related to funding questions).
550. Id. at 53-62.
551. Id. at 62-72.
552. Id at 72.
553. Id. at 72-76.
554. Id. at 76-77.
555. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 77-78.
556. Id. at 78.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 78-81.
559. Id. at 78-79.
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regulation of medical procedures,..o waiting period (or "two-trip")
requirements,5 61 and other informed consent requirements.562 Following this
series of notes, the text includes brief notes that provoke inquiries into a
number of other miscellaneous topics regarding abortion such as the
possibility for a state to ban abortions, 63 the potential to remove abortion
training techniques from medical school programs, M the implications of
neighboring states having differing abortion laws, 65 and a summary of
"basic value issues" on both the prolife and pro-choice sides.566
The text then includes a note about the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994 and abortion protests generally. 567 Within this note,
the text provides an excerpt from the FACE Act, as well as a summary of
other relevant provisions, and brief statements of the holdings in National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
and Hill v. Colorado.5 ' Furrow concludes its discussion of abortion by
including a string cite of articles discussing the issues surrounding abortion
law.5 69
BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW BY ORENTLICHER, BOBINSKI, HALL
Orentlicher introduces the topic of abortion in "The Right and
'Duty' to Die" chapter, and more specifically within the "Physician Aid in
Dying" section, as the book offers a comparison between the two
controversial issues.s' After discussing several issues surrounding
euthanasia, the text proposes that:
In some ways, a right to aid in dying seems more defensible
than a right to abortion. The life being ended is the life of
the person making the decision rather than the life of a third
party. Moreover, what is being taken away is a short period
of great suffering rather than a potential for a full span of a
healthy and productive life. In other ways, the right to aid in
560. Id at 80.
561. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 80.
562. Id at 81.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 81-82.
567. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 82-83.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 83.
570. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 327-28.
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dying is the harder case. In particular, the life of a person
rather than a pre-viable fetus is being taken."'
Following this argument, the text offers quotations from three different
sources illustrating arguments for a right to abortion including a quotation
from Casey,572 Donald H. Regan's Rewriting Roe v. Wade,"' and Jed
Rubenfeld's The Right ofPrivacy.574
The main treatment of abortion is found in the "Reproductive
Rights and Genetic Technologies" chapter in which the text explores the
legal recognition of fetal interests as distinguishable from, and sometimes
conflicting with, those of parents and considers whether "states have the
power to control or to influence personal reproductive decisions." 7 The
text then includes approximately two pages of excerpts from the majority
opinion of Roe, as well as one page of excerpts from Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.176
The first note that follows the edited Roe opinion states "abortion is
a relatively common medical procedure in the United States" and offers
statistics from Lilo T. Strauss's Abortion Surveillance-United States,
2003.17' A second note discusses the personhood of a fetus, stating that the
subject is "an area of significant religious and philosophical debate."17 In
the note discussing fetal personhood, the text discusses DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, summarizing that it held that
"the state did not owe any affirmative duty to protect a child from private
violence inflicted by his father.""
Another note discusses sources of authority in constitutional
interpretation, mentioning Justice Blackmun's engagement with historical,
legal, medical, and religious analysis." The notes continues by discussing
the right to privacy, stating that the right is founded in Fourteenth
571. Id. at 327.
572. Id (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851, in which the majority discusses "the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime" which are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
573. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 327-28 (citing Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v.
Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1979)).
574. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 328 (citing Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 784, 788 (1989)).
575. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 423, introduction to Chapter 5.
576. Id. at 444-46.
577. Id. at 447 (citing Lilo T. Strauss et al., Abortion Surveillance-United States 2003, 55
MMWR 1, 6 (Nov. 24, 2006)).
578. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 447.
579. Id. (also citing Philip G. Peters, The Ambiguous Meaning of Human Conception, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1999 (2006); Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The
Language ofa Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (2001)).
580. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 447.
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Amendment liberty and questions whether Justice Rehnquist's "'Lochner-
ism"' is valid."' Yet another note briefly discusses the state's interest,
summarizing Justice Blackmun's opinion that "the interests of the pregnant
woman and the state can be weighed and evaluated through the use of the
trimester framework." 582
The text then includes a lengthy note discussing "additional ethical
or moral aspects of abortion."" In this note, the text questions what
"appropriate" reasons for abortion are, such as after-the-fact birth control,
eliminating multiple births, avoiding the birth of a child with birth defects,
or deselecting particular characteristics in a child.584 A last note briefly
discusses abortion politics, alluding to the reality that "the abortion debate
produced a new 'litmus test' for potential state and federal judicial
nominees."
Orentlicher then provides excerpts from Casey, including portions
of Parts I, II, IV-VI, approximately a one-half page of Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in part, concurrence in judgment in part, and dissent in part,
and approximately one page of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part. 86 Directly following the Casey
opinion, the text includes Gonzales v. Carhart, providing excerpts from
Parts I, II, and IV, and approximately two pages of Justice Ginsburg's
dissent."'
The first note after Gonzales examines the role of stare decisis at
work in the Casey and Gonzales opinions.5" A second note provokes an
inquiry into whether abortion is now classified as a "fundamental right" or a
"liberty interest" and the appropriateness of the undue burden test.589 The
text continues this second note by explaining that at least four Justices are
unclear as to what their views regarding the undue burden standard are.5 90 A
later note states that Casey has been cited nearly 1,000 times, specifically
for the undue burden standard, to both uphold and strike down state
abortion regulations. 9 ' Another note briefly mentions that changes in the
political climate and the Court have resulted in state legislation being
581. Id. at 447-48.
582. Id. at 44 8.
583. Id. at 448-49.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 449 (note 8 suggests looking at Rachel K. Pimer & Laurie B. Williams, Roe to
Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 144 (1993) for a summary of important
post-Roe cases; but does not provide any further discussion of the article).
586. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 449-58.
587. Id. at 458-67.
588. Id. at 467-68.
589. Id. at 468.
590. Id.
591. Id.
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enacted that challenges Roe.592 The text also mentions that "some
commentators have argued that restrictions on abortion ought to be
challenged under equal protection grounds" and cites Samuel R.
Bagenstos's Disability, Life, Death, and Choice,593 as well as Charles I.
Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being
Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence59 4
for differing equal protection arguments. A last note 95 provides statistics
regarding second-trimester abortions, stating that they are "relatively rare"
and that a "majority of states have enacted severe restrictions on 'intact D &
E' abortions or related procedures."596
The textbook next provides a section comprised of a series of notes
entitled "Notes: Thirty-Five Years of Abortion Jurisprudence."S97 In these
notes, the text examines regulations regarding states requiring abortions to
be performed by physicianss"and states requiring reporting and inspecting
of abortion providers.59 9 The text also offers a relatively lengthy note about
government funding for abortions, briefly summarizing Maher v. Roe,
Harris v. McRae, and Rust v. Sullivan, commenting that regarding Title X
funding issues, "[t]he gag rule was rescinded during the Clinton
administration."oo The issue of minors and abortion is also discussed,60 '
with differing arguments briefly summarized, at one point stating that "[a]s
a policy matter, many minors have the maturity to make these decisions free
from parental interference. Further, a minor's right to make these decisions
free from parental interference may be an important issue in abusive or
incestuous homes."602 Within this note, the text also cites Ohio v. Akron
592. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 468. (citing Monica Davey, South Dakotans Reject
Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P8; and Jeremy Alford, Louisiana's
Governor Plans to Sign Anti-Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A18.
593. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 468 (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life,
Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425, 453-57 (2006)).
594. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 468 (citing Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the
Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119 (2006)).
595. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 468-69 (following this note, the final note
provides a string citation of recent articles reflecting the abortion debate in scholarship. Because
the articles are not discussed in any detail, this report does not include any analysis of the string
citation).
596. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 468-69 (citing Lilo T. Strauss et al., Abortion
Surveillance-United States, 2003, 655 MMWR 1, 15 (Nov. 24, 2006 (SS-11)).
597. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 469-75.
598. Id. at 469.
599. Id. (stating that "[a]lthough many regulations will be upheld given the Supreme Court's
explicit authorization of certain forms of state provider regulation, providers and activists have
successfully challenged some of those new regulatory provisions").
600. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 469-71.
601. Id.at471-72.
602. Id at471.
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Center for Reproductive Health and Hodgson v. Minnesota"o3 and concludes
by suggesting Carol Sanger's Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United
States: Politics and Police and the National Conference of State
Legislatures Parental Consent or Notification for Abortion for "a summary
of the law involving minors and abortion."6 Orentlicher also provides
information regarding informed consent and waiting periods' by providing
sentence summaries of the relevant provisions in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health and Casey, and stating that "[t]he Gonzales decision is
likely to reinforce the trend toward permitting states to impose significant
message-oriented informed consent provisions."606 This particular note
continues by providing a string citation of the "few reported decisions in
which patients have brought informed consent claims against their
physicians" and parentheticals summarizing the holding after each
citation.60 ' The note then finishes its discussion of informed consent by
inquiring as to the proper relationship between informed consent and the
argument that some have posited regarding women experiencing
"significant emotional reactions to the procedure."60s
The next note included in this series briefly summarizes Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth for an example of how courts
treat spousal notification and consent requirements. It also mentions that the
Casey plurality used the undue burden standard to strike down a spousal
notification requirement, and that courts "generally refuse to give genetic
fathers any right to prevent an abortion."609 The text then provides a note
entitled "conscience provisions" exploring the concept that "private
facilities and actors are not required to participate in abortions," as
Congress and state legislatures have enacted "conscience clause statutes" to
protect medical personnel from "retaliatory measures for refusing to
participate in abortions," and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Gonzales
expresses that states may regulate abortion "to protect the integrity and
603. Id at 471-72.
604. Id. at 472.
605. Id at 472-73 (citing Fetal Pain Legislation: Subordinating Sound Medical Findings to
Moral and Political Agendas, 27 J. LEG. MED. 459 (2006); Note, The Science, Law and Politics of
Fetal Pain Legislation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2010 (2002)).
606. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 472.
607. Id. at 473 n.4 (including Humes v. Clinton; Boes v. Deschu; Acuna v. Turkish; Rodriguez
v. Epstein; and Spencer v. Seikel).
608. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 473 (citing Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-
Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 21, 2006 at 41; Nada L. Stotland, The Myth of
the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 JAMA 2078 (1992); A. N. Broen et al., Predictors ofAnxiety
and Depression following Pregnancy Termination: a Longitudinal Five-Year Follow-Up Study, 85
ACTA OBSTET. GYNECOL. SCAND. 317 (2006); and Bendar v. Rosen).
609. ORENTLICHERet al., supra at 473 (citing Annotation, 62 A.L.R.3d 1097 (1975); Adam
Liptak, Ex-Boyfriend Loses Bid to Halt an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at Al0).
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ethics of the medical profession."o61 The note also mentions that with the
FDA's approval of RU-486, there have been claims generated that
pharmacists should have a similar right to conscience provisions.6 1' The
final note in this series discusses "anti-abortion protestors" whose numbers
and commitment have seemed to overwhelm state and local officials. 6 12 The
book discusses abortion supporters' attempt to use RICO against the
protestors, as well as Congress's response by enacting the FACE Act in
1994.613 The text finishes its main discussion of abortion6 14 by providing a
hypothetical regarding late-trimester abortions, specifically in the case of
severely disabled children."
CONCLUSION
The coverage of the euthanasia and abortion issues in the bioethics
textbooks is the inverse of the treatment of these issues in the family law
and constitutional law textbooks. In every bioethics text surveyed, the issue
of euthanasia is addressed in much greater detail than abortion, with nearly
a disproportionate amount of focus on the topic.
While the bias is still present with the abortion issue through the
articles cited and the notes included, there are clear prolife arguments
included in the texts that are notably absent in other subjects surveyed. The
bioethics textbooks briefly discussed the issue of fetal pain, included moral
arguments against abortion from Pope John Paul II, provided the graphic
descriptions of partial-birth abortion procedures from Stenberg, and
described the eventual change in Jane Roe's beliefs regarding abortion,
among a small amount of other discussions illuminating a prolife mindset.
While these articles present a prolife view and should be included in the
other texts and topics surveyed thus far, the overall amount of discussion
provided them is still notably small compared to the pro-choice bias that
permeates the texts.
The treatment of the euthanasia issue in the bioethics textbooks is
large, comprising a major component of each of the texts. Despite this great
amount of information regarding standards of evidence, surrogate decision
making, advanced directives, and physician conscience provisions that
610. ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 474.
611. Id at 474 (also provides a string citation for cases and articles further discussing this
issue).
612. Id at 474-75.
613. Id.
614. Id at 476. Abortion is again mentioned in the section regarding the state's protection of
fetal interests. Roe, Casey, and Gonzales are all mentioned as an illustration for how abortion
cases do not clearly delineate the scope of governmental power in protecting fetal life outside of
abortion jurisprudence.
615. Id. at 474-75.
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provided the reader with a larger working knowledge of the issue, the pro-
choice bias is present. An instance of this bias occurs early in LaFrance's
text, in which he categorizes those facing the euthanasia decision as non-
persons, and more specifically categorizes them as the "undead." While
many of the texts try to offer a more neutral approach by posing several
hypothetical and theoretical questions in the notes that follow the cases,
many of these notes emphasize the privacy of the patients, the desire of the
patients to remain dignified, and the fear of the process of dying. However,
this bias is not completely absolute as many arguments are also presented
that highlight possible moral and ethical dilemmas in the field, including
the slippery slope for persons with disabilities that would likely be
involved, as well as notions of a physician postulating an incorrect
prognosis, the patient changing his or her mind, and those who are mentally
ill making a poorly-influenced decision. Although there appears to be an
overall bias in the euthanasia issue, the information included in the texts is
significantly more informative and educational than in other subjects, and
should be included in much larger degree in all texts that address the topic.
For those texts that discussed both abortion and euthanasia in detail,
there was significantly more information provided about euthanasia than in
any other field surveyed thus far. Notwithstanding this wealth of
information, however, many textbooks seemed to convey uniformly two
views asserted explicitly in two separate texts: first, that families should
decide such matters616 and second, that it is a fundamental principle that
competent adults have the right to make their own healthcare decisions.'
616. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 71-72.
617. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 269.
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